

# **Social Order**

**CHRISTIAN TRADE UNIONS**

**Georges Jarlot**

**February, 1959**

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## **Capitalism's Confused Friends**

**PAUL P. HARBRECHT**

## **The Future of Nuclear Power**

**JAMES F. FAIRMAN**

## **On The First Amendment**

**WILLIAM J. KENEALY**

## **France's Fifth Republic**

**JEAN BOISSONNAT**

## **Parents and Teen-Agers**

**JOHN L. THOMAS**

**MONTHLY OF NATIONAL JESUIT SOCIAL SCIENCE CENTER**

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## ... just a few things:

HOW IDENTIFY and describe a liberal, asks a reader in a letter appearing on our correspondence page?

Max Lerner, a blue apron, 33rd degree liberal (or does *that* description prejudice the definition?), believes that the word is "perhaps the most disputed term of our generation." The three books on the theme that were the subject of Victor Ferkiss' causerie (which, in turn was the subject of our reader's complaint) confirm Mr. Lerner's judgment. For the authors of *Radicals and Conservatives* a liberal is anyone opposed to collectivism; for Professor Cross it is, seemingly, anyone wholeheartedly applauding the American Way of Life; for Currin Shields a liberal is a secularist *tout court* of no matter what century.

A single day's reading of the variety of material that comes to our editorial office confuses things still further. "Ike's Budget Opens Fight On Liberals," says a headline in the *AFL-CIO News*. The attack turns out to be a budget that cuts federal aid for school construction, slum clearance and urban redevelopment, depressed areas, airport construction and aviation safety. "France Pursuing Liberal Economy," says a headline in the *New York Times*. The policy involves the devaluation of the franc, the removal of import quotas, the suppression of government subsidies, the cutting of consumption—measures calculated to reduce the standard of living by five per cent.

In an interview in the January issue of *Work* Senator Eugene J. McCarthy claims to be a liberal and offers this definition:

The liberal is normally somewhat optimistic, not blindly in the sense that he believes things are inevitably getting better and better, but that it is possible, through human attention and effort and changes in institutions, and by being willing to make some effort, that the general lot of mankind can be improved. The liberal is not pessimistic; he doesn't say, "This is a hopeless proposition."

He's normally willing to accept change, not simply for the sake of change, but he says, "Well, now we know at all times there's need for improvement." He's willing to take some chances, and he says, "I'll trust people rather than mistrust them and I'll be a little bit generous rather than extremely selfish and, rather than betray people, I'll take a chance on being betrayed myself."

Father Ginder in *Our Sunday Visitor* pays tribute to the late Episcopalian Canon Bernard Iddings Bell. This sometime member of the Church Socialist League defined a Liberal as

one who thinks that human beings are by nature good and trustworthy, and that everything is sure to get better and better by mere lapse of time, provided only that we rid our life of unfortunate social maladjustments brought about by ancient wickedness such as, of course, no longer exists . . .

A pretty pessimistic view, to be sure. Is, then, the categorizing at bottom a matter of temperament? Is one for or against liberals (it wouldn't seem to make any difference if the word is written upper or lower case) depending on the working of one's humors? Is every American born a liberal or a conservative as English babies were said once to be born Whig or Tory?

Reinhold Niebuhr dispatches the question in a parenthetical aside (and thereby burkes the discussion) in a recent issue of *Christianity and Crisis*.

Deciding that Nelson Rockefeller is more "liberal" than Eisenhower, Professor Niebuhr observes:

(Incidentally, what does this word "liberal" really mean, if not acceptance of the social and political standards that make a highly technical civilization sufferable?)

A liberal here is to be judged, it would appear, not so much by his attitude toward people as by his acceptance of standards.

In the face of such disagreement, one recalls the bewilderment of P. G. Wodehouse's Bertie Wooster: "Complex, complex, my aching foot, how complex!"

Happily an harried editor can easily beg off the task of clarifying either the term or the issue, since this was magisterially done in these pages by Professor Thomas P. Neill in October, 1954 in an article entitled "Liberalism." Author of the *Rise and Decline of Liberalism*, Dr. Neill skillfully traced the evolution of the ideas which successively attached themselves to the term down to our present day when political liberalism has won the field as a protest against economic liberalism. Dr. Neill asked:

Can these three kinds of liberalism—1. Continental liberalism, as viewed by Catholics; 2. Classical liberalism, as expressed by Herbert Spencer and formulated in this country by Graham Sumner; 3. Welfare liberalism of the English liberals of 1906 and the American New Dealers—be seen to have anything in common?

Obviously embarrassed by the imprecision of his diagnosis, Dr. Neill was forced to find a generic meaning in common attitudes: an aversion to a faith that transcends reason, a faith in man's intelligent use of new technology to achieve a better world in the future, a reliance on government for the solu-

tion of economic and political problems. . . .

There are Catholic liberals, Dr. Neill conceded, sound Catholics and sincere liberals. He deemed them "an heroic group," doomed by the nature of their position to the odium heaped upon such a leader as Ozanam in the days of Classical liberalism.

Is discussion of liberalism in terms of its 19th century ancestry "anti-quarian," as our reader suggests? In his call for a "qualitative," as distinguished from a "quantitative," liberalism, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., suggests that we should advance beyond the content of the term as understood in the 1930s, that we should be more concerned with the texture of humane living than with its material substratum (this having been achieved through legislation, due largely to the effort of liberals).

Humane living has not merely texture but dimensions. It would certainly seem to be the function, even the mission, of the Catholic liberals to emphasize the crucial importance of ends, for—if a pun is permitted—ends come first. The American Catholic liberal may well be heartened by the ferment in liberal circles in Europe—the Mount Pelerin Society is a symbol and an example—where the dimensions of life are of as much concern as economic policy. Unless such seriousness possesses American liberals, our Reverend correspondent may share the privilege predicted for the Editor of *SOCIAL ORDER* by a friend, a liberal and a fellow-countryman—of being assigned to productive work.

E. D., s.J.

*SOCIAL ORDER*



# Parents, Teen-Agers and Dating Patterns

JOHN L. THOMAS, S.J.

A FOREIGN OBSERVER has cynically remarked that American parents divide most of their time between worrying about when their children will turn in and how they will turn out. Judging from some contemporary dating practices, they have good reason to worry on both scores.

Many parents feel that they are caught in a dilemma. Though not approving of what is happening, they feel powerless to resist current social pressures. They and their children want to live in, not alongside of, society. Hence these worried parents tolerate popular dating patterns while ignoring or vainly hoping to avoid their objectionable consequences.

Criticizing parents has become such a popular pastime that even high school texts are suggesting that teen-agers write essays on what's wrong with "Pop" and "Mom." During the past few decades a series of contradictory, often bizarre, theories about how to raise children have claimed the field. Child psychologists told parents to be "permissive." Authority became a

nasty word. Educators grew quite impatient with parental "interference" and insisted that parents leave the training of youth to them. Little wonder that many fathers and mothers are now confused and perplexed. They rightly feel they are being blamed for taking the "experts" at their word. Yet the steady rise of juvenile delinquency hasn't dampened the enthusiasm of the "experts." Evidently there is little connection between theory and practical consequences.

What's wrong with modern parents? Obviously the majority are at least seriously trying to do a good job. Through the grace of vocation and native intelligence, they have all that is normally needed for success. If they fail, it must be that they ignore or do not fully appreciate some of the pertinent factors involved in the child raising process. A review of these facts should help parents clarify their thinking so that they can approach their task with greater confidence and prudence. Though the entire child rearing process is necessarily involved, our chief concern in this review will be with current dating patterns.

*Father Thomas' latest book is The Family Clinic, published by The Newman Press.*

## **The situation**

Why are modern dating patterns the subject of such concern? After all, it might be argued that in a society which requires young people to select and even to compete for suitable marriage partners there must be some standard social means through which boys and girls can become acquainted and thus make intelligent selections. Since parents no longer choose their children's mates and there are no marriage brokers, some type of dating or courtship must precede the trip to the altar. All systems are subject to abuse and, so it is asserted, if you want people to enter marriage in our society, you must take this chance.

Now the singular feature of the dating causing the present concern is that it is not directly related to courtship or entrance into marriage. Starting in the early teens, years before marriage can be realistically considered, it has rapidly become an accepted, normal characteristic of American adolescent social life. The process frequently begins in grade school, is accepted and often encouraged by parents and teachers, who, through some strange twist of logic, still maintain traditional Christian attitudes toward chastity and sex. By the time boys and girls are sophomores in high school, they are expected to be dating rather consistently, so that mothers grow anxious if there are no rivals for their daughters' attentions or if their sons display no interest in girls.

Although this youthful dating is supposed to have none of the seriousness characteristic of premarital courtship, it imitates courtship closely in language

and gesture. There are similar exclusiveness, possessiveness and intimate displays of affection; yet these attitudes and gestures are assumed to be part of a game which young people play without seriousness or deep emotional involvement. Mature adults would find this game psychologically and morally dangerous. Apparently young teenagers, passing through the trying stages of puberty, are supposed to have more balance and self-control!

## **Who started it?**

Cultural anthropologists tell us that no other recorded society has ever attempted to institutionalize this type of social behavior for its youth. To be sure, there are numerous other societies like the South Sea Trobriand Islanders and the Samoans, for example, who grant their youth a period of experiment and sexual freedom before marriage; this is clearly intended to be a period of sensual and sexual enjoyment. Some of our contemporary teen-age dating customs supply similar opportunities, though they are supposed to include no sensual or sexual overtones.

Many parents are wondering how these new dating patterns were introduced. Why have they received such rapid, widespread acceptance? There is no simple answer. A whole series of changes in both our family system and our beliefs has produced the necessary social conditions and climate of opinion within which these customs could develop. Because the change was rapid and many different factors were involved, few parents became aware of what was happening until the shift was well under way. By that time, the new

patterns appeared inevitable. Today most parents feel they have little choice other than to accept them.

Dating patterns, like other social customs, are neither inevitable nor unchangeable. Perhaps a brief analysis of the changed conditions and the views that shaped the present situation will provide a better understanding of what has happened and will supply some insights on possible action.

In the first place, our traditional family system has been rapidly modified under the impact of industrialization and urbanization. The family unit has grown smaller; economically, it has become primarily a consuming rather than a producing unit; and extensive mobility has tended to weaken kinship and neighborhood bonds. These changes have lessened the popular esteem that the domestic unit formerly enjoyed. Moreover, since money income has become so important to the average American, many wives and mothers now feel that they can make their best contribution to the family by seeking employment outside the family circle. At the same time, new forms of transportation and communication have greatly lessened the traditional significance of the home as the locus of instruction, solidarity and intimate family interaction. Paradoxically, though industrialization should have greatly increased family leisure time, parents and children spend less time together in the home; even when they are together, the radio and the television sometimes seriously limit real communication.

As a result of all these changes, fathers tend to focus their interest and energy primarily on their jobs. The job is an individual affair, one not involv-

ing other family members; it is, moreover, directly and clearly separated from the domestic unit. Hence, growing children do not see their father operating in his essential role as breadwinner and producer; they come to regard him as a vague source of spending money. This tends to lessen his prestige, while it limits his contacts with them. Under these circumstances, the father's assertion of authority becomes more difficult, since authority that is exercised rarely or only in restricted areas of the child's activity is bound to be resented.



As a consequence, the mother's role in the training and guidance of children has been notably extended. More than ever before, she tends to become the primary formative influence in their lives not only during childhood but throughout the teen-age period. Obviously, if she is employed outside the home, she will find it difficult to meet their need for guidance and emotional support, although she may try to compensate for this loss by increasing the family budget. However, if she regards her domestic career as a full-time job, and many mothers still do, she faces the difficulty of getting her husband to share adequately in the child rearing process. Unfortunately, some mothers attempt to take over this parental function completely, forgetting that their views and aspirations necessarily bear a one-sided, purely feminine stamp.

The younger generation are likewise affected by these changes. They are inevitably exposed to a great variety of new, conflicting and contradictory attitudes and practices. Numerous interests and activities tend to focus their attention outside the family circle. Though our highly productive economy enables us to keep them in school during long, formative years, neither parents nor educators have yet learned how to induce them to study seriously and perseveringly. At the same time, young people are shielded from responsibility and are urged to enjoy themselves in an unreal, temporarily carefree existence, offering few real challenges to their expanding energies and little preparation for the assumption of adult roles.

Finally, since the home and the family circle have become less significant, young people tend to seek assurance and acceptance from their peer group, the gang. The symbols of success recognized by their age-group become the goals for which they strive, while the views and practices of their gang largely determine their conduct.

### **Consequences for dating**

How do these changes affect the practice of dating? Only two of the major consequences can be discussed here.

First, for various reasons, mothers tend to be more interested in social life and in the need to promote the socialization of their children than do fathers. They are anxious that their sons and daughters should be socially acceptable and accepted. Having assumed the principal role in the rearing process, they now vigorously promote the social

life of their children as one of their chief preoccupations. Since they obviously derive considerable vicarious satisfaction from the popularity of their youngsters (being well aware that the game is a highly competitive one), they tend to enter their young hopefuls into the contest at ever earlier ages.

Coupled with this quite understandable maternal anxiety to guarantee the popularity of their children is another feminine trait. In our culture women appear to ignore the biological and psychological consequences of sexual development in their children—perhaps even in themselves. Hence, they can thoughtlessly promote the early, frequent, and relatively intimate heterosexual association of their youngsters, while ignoring its necessarily emotional and sexual overtones. When this is called to their attention, mothers generally protest, "But my children are not that way!" Of course the only logical answer to such protests is the suggestion that their children are abnormal.

A second consequence of our changed family system pertains to the younger generation. If the home and family circle lose significance, children must seek acceptance and emotional support from their peer group either at school or in gangs. Under present conditions this means that they associate as couples. The process starts in the grade school with the result that there is no longer any precedent for single sex groupings among teen-agers. Hence, young people feel they must have dates if they wish to participate in the social life of their age groups. Since they lack security and proficiency in making

friendships, they find it safer and less bothersome to fix on one partner; thus the much discussed pattern of "steady dating" becomes a routine one.

These changes in our family system do not by themselves wholly explain the present situation nor do they indicate its far-reaching implications for Catholic parents. Accompanying these changes was a drastic shift in attitudes and beliefs concerning the meaning of sex in marriage. Although the majority of Americans still pay lip-service to traditional views in this regard, a little analysis of tolerated, if not promoted, practices reveals that current dating patterns are based on new premises.

### **Meaning of sex lost**

Stated briefly, sex has been divorced from its reproductive function. It is now regarded as a faculty which can be enjoyed primarily for its own sake both inside and outside marriage. Further, the enjoyment of sex and its related sensual satisfactions has been removed from the moral order. What one chooses to do in this regard is left up to the individual and is determined by how he defines his peculiar needs. Sexual expression in its many forms is regarded as a legitimate means for manifesting mutual affection and pleasure outside of marriage. As an acceptable form of "play" between the unmarried, sex has become institutionalized in contemporary dating practices. Since, however, intercourse may entail embarrassing social consequences, "necking" and "petting," implying various degrees of mutual stimulation and arousal, ideally stopping short of the orgasm of

intercourse, are normally substituted for it.

It follows that Catholic parents who are anxious to have their children participate fully in the social life of their contemporaries face an apparent dilemma. They wish to conform to the demands of their social situation; on the other hand, the Catholic view of premarital chastity is clear-cut and well-known. Some parents hope to avoid the objectionable features of the present pattern by frequent warnings and exhortations. This approach may help; it does not, however, touch the root of the trouble because it assumes that the emotional involvements and infatuations leading to "petting," and even intercourse, result primarily from lack of knowledge or bad intentions. In reality, they are the expected, easily anticipated outcome of the present dating situation and can be avoided only if the situation is changed. Neither knowledge nor grace can be expected effectively to counteract normal human adolescent drives, willfully exposed to constant stimulation.

### **The facts in the case**

This review of the situation, its causes and consequences, suggests the need of a more realistic appraisal of all the facts in the case. First, there is the fact of puberty. Roughly between the ages of 12 and 14, young boys and girls normally experience the rapid growth and development of their secondary sexual characteristics and of their reproductive systems. At the culmination of this stage they become capable of sexual stimulation and arousal and even of the conjugal act. The phe-

nomenon of sex now assumes personal significance. Each individual must understand and make his own the norms that regulate its various manifestations. Provided young people have been adequately instructed, this sudden discovery of new powers and avenues of experience is gradually followed by increased self-knowledge and the awareness of new responsibilities. The process takes time but, as experience widens, controls are gradually internalized and reasonable self-mastery is achieved. This necessarily includes elements of self-denial, self-knowledge, and the learned avoidance of unnecessary stimuli. It also implies prudent attention to physical exercise, expanding interests and some clarification of one's goals in life.

It would seem obvious that puberty is not the time to engage in dating, with all the features the practice now implies. To do so is to expose young people to additional, unnecessary stimulation; it focuses their attention, moreover, on impulses and drives over which they have not yet acquired control, and the profound significance of which they do not understand.

### **Teen-agers are not adults**

This points to a second fact. Teen-agers are not adults. They are young people at various stages of development on the way to maturity. Parental guidance, supervision, and control must consequently be geared to their stage of development in various areas. Adolescence is a time of rapid physical, emotional, intellectual, and spiritual growth. In our society it is the period during which young people must choose their life-goals and acquire the solid founda-

tion in formal education and character development that will enable them to achieve their goals.

Parents do their teen-agers a serious disservice when they continue to treat them as irresponsible children, left ignorant of the challenges of life, yet free to explore its most intimate, profound mysteries.



The facts in the case are obvious. Adult success and happiness in a complex, highly industrialized society such as our own requires years of formal training, together with the development of a sense of responsibility, self-control, and discipline. These can be achieved only by serious application of interest and energy during adolescence. At the same time, the capacity for sexual experience develops during the early teens. If prevailing attitudes and practices focus adolescent attention on the various manifestations of sex, solid preparation for adult life will not be achieved, for the energy and scope of interest of any individual are limited. By a strange lack of logic our society promotes sexual attitudes and practices among adolescents which hinder the preparation required for adulthood, if our civilization is to survive.

The situation facing Catholic parents is even more agonizing. They know the norms of Christian morality.



Reflection on their own experience should make them aware of the necessary relationship between intimate heterosexual association and infatuation, as well as between the reasonable avoidance of sexual stimulation and the observance of chastity. Common sense should tell them that the currently permitted intimate association between teen-agers is bound to lead to emotional involvement (love), long before marriage can be seriously considered; it should tell them, too, that many accepted practices in dating are bound to be sexually stimulating for all except the abnormal.

In other words, Catholic parents must face the fact that our postchristian, secular society with its neurotic overemphasis of sex, has established patterns of conduct which neither they nor their children can accept if they wish to remain faithful to Christ.

### **What can parents do?**

This raises the question of practical programs of action. In formulating such programs it is of primary importance to realize that piecemeal solutions, such as the mere prohibition of steady dating, will prove neither feasible nor effective, for the elements of a social system tend to be interrelated and integrated. Briefly, this means you cannot eliminate one element without replacing it; nor can you hope to change one mode of conduct without modifying the attitudes and conditions functionally related to it. For example, if "steady dating" among teen-agers is deemed objectionable, current attitudes and practices related to early dating, adolescent recreation, study, sex instruc-

tion, marriage preparation, parental authority and so on must be modified. At present the practice of "steady dating" is fulfilling felt needs created by the social system. The practice will be eliminated only to the extent that alternate means of meeting these needs are found.

### **An integrated program**

Hence, an integrated program for Catholic parents would seem to involve at least the following elements:

1. Parents must assume their responsibilities for moral instruction and guidance from the cradle on. Unless the growing child identifies them as the normal sources of instruction, guidance and authority in the beginning, parents will find it impossible to assume these roles during the teen-age period. Studies reveal that all too many Catholic parents entrust these basic functions to the school. As a result, their children tend to resent or reject their assumption of authority during puberty and adolescence.

2. Parents must realize that family solidarity is not automatically achieved by mere cohabitation. The family dwelling can come to be regarded either as a hotel or as a home. Parents and children experience the needed sense of loyalty and solidarity only if they do things together, *i. e.*, pray together, eat together, work together, play together, plan together, and so on. This means that both father and mother must cooperate in building up the sense of participation in the family. It implies that growing children are gradually introduced into the family council, sharing with their parents normal



domestic concerns related to income, budget, health, entertainment, household tasks, vacations, future education and so on. Thus, family solidarity is increased and adolescents pass through an excellent apprenticeship for married life.

3. Parents must provide appropriate alternatives to the current early teenage preoccupation with dating. Among other things, youth must be given challenging ideals, something to strive for in life as men and women. What is the meaning of life? What are the goals worth working for? What qualities of character, what training do they require?

### Parents as Educators

This involves the gradual process of instilling long-range thinking and day-to-day motivation. Young people lack experience and live under the tyranny of the present moment. In their narrow world, each small incident looms large. They must be patiently taught life-goals and perspective. Likewise, the development of their intellectual and spiritual powers must be aided and encouraged by creating a climate of opinion in the family circle which shows respect for serious application to study; interest in art, science and literature; and awareness of the social problems and world events challenging modern man.

At the same time, parents must give some thought to the leisure time of their children. This is a growing problem in modern society; parental failure to meet it constructively forces young people to devise their own solutions. Parents should see to it that their

children acquire some skill in appropriate forms of physical exercise such as skating, swimming, tennis, organized sports and so forth, whether under parental supervision or at proper community centers. Group entertainment




for young teen-agers should be supplied primarily *en famille* through the cooperation of several families facing similar needs.

4. Parents should sincerely re-examine their attitudes and motives on the early launching or socializing of their children. Some parents thoughtlessly ignore the problem, trusting that their children will make out for themselves. Others display an almost neurotic anxiety to launch them early, arguing that since the sexes must live together as adults, they must learn to do so while growing up. Such a view simply ignores the facts of life. In addition to directing the energy and interests of young people away from serious preparation for adult life, this practice neglects the dangers of harmful emotional involvements and violations of chastity. It is well to reflect that young people acquire their basic attitudes toward masculine and feminine personality primarily within the family circle and not in the shallow, emotionally immature contacts of their early teens.

5. Parents should remember that older teen-agers also require guidance

and supervision. When junior or senior high school students are permitted to attend parties or dances, some of the parents should attend as chaperones. In general, parents should know where their young people are, with whom they are, and what they plan to do for entertainment. Further, they should have a clear understanding with their boys and girls on the time when they are to be home. Parents who neglect these reasonable precautions are guilty of serious dereliction of duty.

6. Parents must instruct and guide their children in the development of modesty and chastity. This implies that they have a positive approach to the Christian concept of sex.<sup>1</sup> In general, parents should recognize that before puberty their children's questions represent a legitimate, impersonal quest for knowledge, motivated by normal curiosity, and should be answered accordingly. At puberty, they should be shown the relationship between their growing reproductive faculties and the privilege of parenthood, for it is this capacity to share with God in the pro-



creative act that lends dignity and nobility to all that is related to sex. Further, teen-agers should be given some understanding of the physical and psychological mechanism of sexual arousal in themselves and in

others. They should be helped to view sexual stimulation as a normal process that they must regulate directly in themselves and indirectly in their companions, to the extent that they avoid actions normally calculated to cause undue stimulation. They should consider the acquisition of this control as part of the normal process of "growing up" and of becoming mature. It necessarily



involves knowledge, experience, honesty with self and a good intention. It also includes a loving, personal attachment to Christ as model and leader.

### **Dignity of marriage**

Finally, lest "Pop" and "Mom" feel that the effort is too great, parents should reflect on the meaning of their vocation. Marriage is a dedication to the service of new life. Through the sacrament, husband and wife are consecrated, that is, set aside to perform a special work within the Mystical Body. They are to cooperate with the Creator in bringing new life into the world and with the Redeemer in raising up new members of the Kingdom. Parenthood has always been an exacting, though highly rewarding task. By sincerely striving to fulfill it, fathers and mothers work out their salvation in Christ. And they have all they need for the job: the grace of vocation, mutual love—and their common sense.

<sup>1</sup> See John L. Thomas, S.J., "The Place of Sex," *SOCIAL ORDER*, 7 (May, 1957) pp. 195-202. Reprints available at 25c.

WITHOUT a single railroad train grinding to a stop, without a single paving block pulled up to build barricades in Paris, without a shot, without a single drop of blood being spilled, France has changed its government. The Fourth Republic which lasted only a dozen years has been succeeded by the Fifth. What was unthinkable as recently as last year has become a reality which the French are taking for granted: President Charles de Gaulle is at the Elysée Palace and is governing the country.

The key question is whether this change of the Constitution and of the personalities directing the country represents a real revolution or whether the calm in which the events took place indicates that there will be no great changes ahead.

In point of fact, the Fifth Republic came into being quite tranquilly precisely because the Fourth had scarcely any defenders left, if indeed it ever had any convinced ones. The first and the only protest meeting against the seizure of power in Algeria by army officers on May 13th—the event which was the immediate cause of the present transformation of France's political regime—did not take place until two weeks later. On May 28th 200,000 manifestants paraded very calmly down the principal boulevards of Paris. By their action these men proposed to endorse the essential idea of a republican form of government rather than the performance of the Fourth Republic whose defects they had all freely criticized. They would, moreover, have been hard put to find

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*The writer collaborates with the Revue de l'Action Populaire of the French Jesuits.*

"No one can say

## France's

common ground, since communists, socialists, radicals, militant Christians and a great number without party affiliation (chiefly from the academic world) marched side by side in the parade. This public support was of no avail to the government headed by Pierre Pflimlin, President of the Christian Democratic Party (Mouvement Républicain Populaire).

The government seems to have recognized early in the crisis that it must yield its place to General de Gaulle. On May 28th, therefore, Premier Pflimlin resigned, although he had won a vote of confidence in the Assembly. On the first of June the same Parliament voted the premiership to General de Gaulle and thus drew the curtain on the Fourth Republic.

The life of the dead regime had, however, covered a period of time of France's history which cannot be listed as unrelievedly unfortunate. Quite the contrary. An objective reading of the record of the Fourth Republic shows that its good points can be compared with its failures without too much embarrassment.

today what the final outcome will be."

# *Fifth Republic*

JEAN BOISSONNAT

In the area of economic and social endeavors the France of the Fourth Republic certainly enjoyed one of the most brilliant epochs of her history, one comparable only to that of the Second Empire in the 19th century and to the period of 1925-29, the aftermath of World War I and the eve of the world-wide depression. The great structural reforms of the French economy, realized in 1945-46, were the beginning of the revival. The nationalization of basic sectors of the economy (coal, electricity, transportation, credit) and the introduction of a system of investment developed these basic industries; their weakness had been the principal soft spot in France's pre-war economy. The establishment of a complete system of Social Security was a notable factor in maintaining a high consumer demand; it did this by transferring the income of those employed towards people economically disadvantaged (the sick, the aged, and children). On the other hand, the extent of the system of Social Security seriously reduced the possibility of saving, since any tendency towards leveling incomes favors consumption but damages sav-

ing; savings had in fact been already sharply reduced by the losses resulting from two world wars. An excessive inflation was connected with the national economic expansion, bringing in its wake social instability and an almost routine dependence on foreign economic aid, especially that of the United States, to stabilize the chronically disadvantageous balance of payments.

Nevertheless, these imperfections of the economic system did not wholly impede progress. Between 1938 and 1957 the industrial production of the country doubled, and this despite the handicap of the German occupation (1940-44) and the difficulties of the reconstruction period (1945-49). Agricultural production is 25 per cent higher than it was before the war.

A more fundamental index still is the improvement in the birth rate. In place of the 650,000 births of the pre-war years, Frenchmen since 1946 are being born at an uninterrupted rate of 800,000 each year or 8.6 births per one thousand of the population, the highest birth rate of any of the principal European countries. This fact

is all the more striking when one remembers that before World War II the country had the lowest birth rate in Europe. This total reversal of attitude on the value of children is a sign of more fundamental changes in the national character than are indicated by individual political reforms.

Today less than one per cent of France's employable population is out of work; there is an automobile for each eighth inhabitant (as against one for 16 before the war); the country is producing 15 million tons of steel each year (as against six million before the war); its farmers have 500,000 tractors (as against 40,000 formerly). These economic transformations have marked the French mentality.

### **Apathy for politics**

The improvement of the standard of living of the working class, despite failures or the delays in some social areas of enormous importance such as housing or schools, has considerably increased the average Frenchman's desire for security, a factor which explains his extreme distrust of politics. Expansion of the economy has bred a spirit of enterprise among businessmen. The principal concern of these managers is to have a political system which functions smoothly, which will not by its instability rock the economic boat and which will be aware of the need of intervening in the economic life of the country to anticipate slumps, to aid basic expansion and to guarantee social peace through fitting legislation.

If France so easily avoided a civil war in the course of the summer of 1958, it was not only by reason of the

prestige of General de Gaulle; it was also because the average Frenchman has become indifferent to political ideologies. A concern for economic security is immensely more important to him and to his compatriots of all social classes than political adventures.

Paradoxically the change of the political regime was judged by public opinion as a consolidation of the economic and social activities won under the previous regime. This was deemed to have been achieved by eliminating its most worrisome feature, the feature constantly menacing the benefits acquired under the Fourth Republic: political instability. Right or wrong, the average Frenchman last summer concluded that the continuance of the Fourth Republic was a political adventure and that the establishment of a Gaullist republic would provide security and a guarantee against both communism and military fascism.

It can be said that the Fourth Republic was a victim of its own success. One can phrase the fact more accurately by noting the regime was plagued by the disequilibrium resulting from its economic success and its political failure. The French were looking for institutions insuring their prosperity; no one yet knows if they have found them.

There is a second paradox in the current French picture: the country is passing through an extreme crisis of nationalism at the exact moment when it has decisively committed itself, under the Common Market agreement (which became effective this January 1), to the road of European integration.

Among the principal new orientations fostered by the Fourth Republic one must doubtless list the European policy, initiated in 1950 by Robert Schuman's proposal of the Coal and Steel Community. Behind this policy there was the realization of the decline of the European Powers and of the necessity of unity if they were to play a role on the international scene and were to oppose the communist menace. Concern was felt that this unity should have as its foundation a Franco-German reconciliation. Conviction also grew that a task of unification, reconciliation and integration can be achieved only step by step through the creation of instruments of mutual interests and by the surrender—a point of capital importance—of a measure of national sovereignty to common institutions.

To construct Europe politically is an endeavor whose soundness is attributable as much to the lessons of history as to the imagination of the Cabinets of the Fourth Republic.

The European perspective was, moreover, closely linked to the country's economic policy; it is in the context of this European policy that the nation has steered its way, save for the unhappy defeat of a European Defense Community, first proposed, rather reluctantly, by France. The economic expansion of the country has permitted France to rid herself of her inferiority complex toward Germany; it has also furnished her with the courage to associate herself with her eastern neighbor; she is prepared to accept the challenge of competing German products without at all seeking the traditional counterweight of British influence or

the not less traditional alliance with Russia.

### **European commitment firm**

The recent dispute on the free trade zone has demonstrated that French public opinion has approved this entirely new orientation of the country's foreign policy. General de Gaulle, formerly a resolute opponent of the supranational institutions of Little Europe (Germany, France, Italy, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg), left the country for the first time to go to Germany in the interest of the Common Market Treaty and not to Moscow to negotiate a new Franco-Russian accord, thus confounding the prophets.

The crisis of nationalism has not, then, won out over the still fragile system of European institutions. Should the new nationalism grow or be exploited politically, it could compromise the spirit and functioning of the European Idea, for the European policy inaugurated in 1950 leads inevitably to a limiting of the role of the national state or it fails. At the present time the Fifth Republic by General de Gaulle's personal decision has not abandoned the European orientation of the Fourth Republic, a decision approved by the majority of Frenchmen who are sincerely pleased by the reconciliation with Germany.

French nationalism is no longer a product of hatred of Germany. It draws its tinder from a conflict in which the Fourth Republic, whatever its other economic and diplomatic successes, met its ultimate defeat: the conflict between the old colonizing nations and the peoples demanding freedom.



## The colonial problem

It is not by chance that the earthquake which tumbled the Fourth Republic came from Algiers. For France the reshaping of her relations with her colonies is a more complicated problem than for the other countries with colonies. The difficulty derives in the first place from France's conception of her mission, a conception much more unselfish than is often conceded. Since the last war the French have invested in their overseas possessions twice as much as have the English and only 40 per cent less than the Americans, whose national income is ten times greater than that of France. Nor is material generosity at issue here. The French have conquered territories rather to see their flag in all parts of the world than to sell their products there.

They have genuinely conceived colonization as an emancipation of peoples, something different than their independence. This emancipation permits individuals (thanks to a long effort of education) access to French citizenship, the supreme gift of the mother country to distant lands thus linked with her. France has exported her ideas. Of the three which form her motto *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité*, it is to the second of these qualities that she certainly attaches the greatest importance.

A policy founded on such principles risks disappointment. Nationalist demands in the colonies strike Frenchmen as an affront or as ingratitude. And yet these nationalist demands feed on the principles of French policy: an Equality, proclaimed in principle, is not found verified in fact in the colonies and this inevitably; such a paradox

strikes the young intellectuals of the colonial countries as a denial of Fraternity; this, in turn, incites them to invoke the principles of Liberty and of national sovereignty, ideas which they then turn against the mother country. As long as it was only a question of trade relations, France and her colonies could find acceptable compromises in tentative commercial agreements. When, however, ideas come into play, war is the most probable outcome.

Such is the elementary outline of the terrible drama which France is enduring. To the elements of this drama must be added the vision of being the last rampart against communism in the underdeveloped countries where Marxism is the great and effective intellectual seduction; to the drama must also be added the notion of being misunderstood, not to say unfairly disadvantaged materially, by her allies.

While all the other nations mothballed their arms, France has practically known no peace since V-E Day. Amid general indifference, her army suffered in Indo-China a profoundly painful defeat, one whose memories it seeks clearly to erase. Public opinion, too, is galled by what it considers the liquidation of Indo-China, of Tunisia and of Morocco. For the army as well as for the civilian population, therefore, Algeria is viewed as the last corner of territory where a halt must be made.

The Algerian crisis, moreover, is made immensely more dramatic by the fact that a million Europeans live there and invoke national solidarity as a claim for their defense. It must be admitted that no colonial power has had to resolve a problem of such complexity, one



touching so intimately the soul of its people.

To save Algeria, Frenchmen have accepted a period of military service of 27 months, the longest in the Western world, and this while the economy is suffering a manpower shortage; they have accepted a military budget amounting to nearly 10 per cent of the national income, and this while the economy lacks capital for investment and expansion.

Now the same political system which demanded such efforts of the country, which described the Algerian crisis as an issue of life or death for France, at the same time supplied a ritualistic spectacle of Cabinet collapses, of parliamentary routine deaf to public opinion, of instability and of divisions. These divisions were so artificial that the Socialist Party, victor in the 1956 election on a promise to end the "stupid war" in Algeria, once it was in office mobilized the country for the same war as if it were a sacred ideal. It was impossible to understand the basis of opposition between men in public life whose ideas changed so readily.

### **Weakness of the Fourth Republic**

France would have needed a regime exceptionally solid not to have exhausted itself in such conflicts. Yet the Fourth Republic was born weak. In 1946 its Constitution had been adopted by a vote of only 9,297,000 of 26 million registered voters. The very man who had re-established the Republic challenged the new regime six months later. In 1947 General de Gaulle founded the *Rassemblement du Peuple Français*, a party which received

38 per cent of the vote in the municipal elections. At the same time the Communist Party left the coalition government, thus transferring 25 per cent of the nation's voters to the government's opposition. In other words, the Fourth Republic had in less than one year from its birth nearly two-thirds of the French electorate against it. The opponents of the government never controlled less than 40 per cent of the votes. It was always necessary to find, then, from among the spokesmen for the remaining 60 per cent some makeshift, transient coalition to form a government (one which would inevitably represent a minority of the country) and a parliamentary opposition. The instability of Cabinets was an expression of the arithmetic of the political situation as much as of the character of the politicians themselves.

Since the end of the war France had governments directed by 18 different individuals, while the United States had only two, the Soviet Union three, Great Britain four and Germany one. Under such circumstances one is less surprised by the death of the Fourth Republic than by the duration of its life.

General de Gaulle had repeatedly asserted that without a solid government France would never solve her difficulties, the first of which was the reshaping of her relations with her former colonies. Events having proved him right, the country naturally turned toward him when the Fourth Republic foundered. The outcome was so clear to public opinion that no one imagined any other solution; all of the political obstacles disappeared, empty challenges to the nature of things.

## De Gaulle in power

The Fourth Republic signed its own death certificate. Its Assembly legally accepted General de Gaulle as Premier and gave him, not less legally, the necessary powers to reform the state. The new Premier was, moreover, careful to underline a continuity of forms by bringing into his Cabinet the principal personages of the former regime, Guy Mollet, Pierre Pflimlin, Antoine Pinay, etc. His program featured the items that were the failures of the Fourth Republic: the problems of the colonies (and especially Algeria) and the reform of the structure of government.

Public opinion certainly expected more spectacular results on the first than on the second item. On the contrary, General de Gaulle concentrated on the reform of the structure of government. He constantly declared that France would not solve the questions of her colonies until she had provided herself with a political regime sufficiently stable to act with continuity and sufficiently strong to maintain without legal compulsion her links with the peoples on the road to cultural emancipation, persuading all to accept a progressive reformulation of these bonds.

When the new Premier visited Algeria for the first time, it was less to resolve the Algerian crisis than to establish the authority of his government. Patiently and with a skill which one had not surmised him to possess, he managed to dissolve the Committees of Public Safety which had come into existence on May 13; he began to transfer military officers compromised in that coup; just before the end of the

year, he finally reestablished civil authority in Algiers, naming an experienced government official of liberal tendencies, Paul Delouvrier, to replace General Salan who had held all the reins of power since the 13th of May.

There are some regrets today that General de Gaulle did not more quickly exploit the prestige which he enjoyed in all sectors of the population at the time of his visit to tackle the Algerian problem at its roots, that is to say, to solve that political issue definitively. It may well be that the propitious circumstances of that hour will not be repeated. It is clear, however, that General de Gaulle does not propose to govern in such a fashion.

There was only a single occasion when one had the impression that he was seeking a political solution of the Algerian problem; this was at his press conference in October after the Constitution he had proposed had been approved by the votes of four of every five Frenchmen. His language then amounted to an offer to treat with the leaders of the Algerian nationalists. The insufficiency of advance preparation for such a proposal through private channels, the unhappy interpretation of the Premier's words (presented by most of the journalists as an offer to accept a surrender) and probably also the rivalries of the nationalist leaders themselves doomed the attempt to failure.

Thus it is that the Algerian problem remains today still without a solution. Whatever be the temporary improvement of the military situation, General de Gaulle is certainly not deluding himself on the point. The Moslem parliamentarians chosen in the November elections include not a single national-

ist; General de Gaulle surely does not propose to "finish the business" (to use his words)—that is to say, to frame a definitive political structure for Algeria—with these men only. He seems to have preferred practical measures: reduce as far as possible the military power of the Algerian nationalists while deeming their leaders always as among the politically representative spokesmen; launch a bold program of economic and social development.

Whatever the ultimate form of his policy, it seems certain that as President of the Republic General de Gaulle is keeping the direction of the Algerian problem in his own hands. It is in this determination of his that the link between the task of reforming the state and the need of solving France's concrete problems is most apparent.

### **Mixed political regime**

The reform of the political structure of the state accomplished by General de Gaulle is the product of a peculiar conception of power. On analysis the Constitution of the Fifth Republic amounts to a compromise between a parliamentary regime and a presidential form of government. From the first type it retains the element of Cabinet responsibility to a Parliament chosen by universal suffrage. From the second, it takes its tendency to separate strictly the powers of the executive from the legislative and the judicial branches, as well as its idea of the positive role of the President of the Republic. The President ceases to be a sheer symbol of the continuity of the State, the more respected the less he intervenes in day to day, concrete issues. Now the head of the State is chosen by an electoral

college of 80,000 voters drawn from the municipal counselors of each city, from the members of the General Councils of each department and from those of the Parliamentary Assemblies. He alone chooses the Prime Minister. He is not only the President of the Republic of France; he is at the same time the President of the *Communauté*, that is to say, the association of the peoples of federated territories and the French nation. As such he wields extensive powers.

The danger of such a Constitution is clear. What will happen in the case of a conflict between the Assembly (which alone is chosen by universal suffrage) and the President (who can dissolve it, although he himself is not chosen by the people)? As long as General de Gaulle is at the Elysée Palace such a conflict will probably not occur. There is even less probability of the situation arising, since the largest group in the Assembly, *l'Union pour la Nouvelle République*, owes its success at the elections to the campaign which it undertook in the name of General de Gaulle although, in point of fact, without his support.

The very gravity of the Algerian problem may likewise strengthen the new presidential regime. The only people who claim to have a political solution for it—that of the total integration of Algeria and the mother country—are precisely those who for the moment at least boast of being the warmest supporters of General de Gaulle; he, incidentally, rejects their solution. As long as fidelity to the man counts more than fidelity to ideas, the conflict will be avoided; if it should break out, there is no doubt at all that

in the *present circumstances* public opinion in France would disavow its own elected parliamentarians and would follow General de Gaulle, thus ratifying after a fashion his presidential power.

From this analysis there emerges, nevertheless, the covert confusion on which the new institutions are constructed. There is confusion as to the real meaning of the new political regime, legally parliamentary in form but presidential in fact; there is confusion in the direction of the policy for Algeria, definitely less liberal among those who brought General de Gaulle to power than is his personal view. It should be noted that General de Gaulle had written into the Constitution recognition of the right to independence of the peoples of colonies; *legally* this provision does not include *Algeria* but *politically* such a viewpoint cannot be halted at the edges of the Sahara.

The confusions and the upsets have been sufficiently strong to disorganize France's traditional political forces but not to replace them. The Communist Party has lost a quarter of its voters and nine-tenths of its seats in the National Assembly; the Socialist Party lost half of its representation in parliament while the Radical Party literally burst asunder, each faction losing its principal leaders, MM. André Morice, Edgar Faure and Pierre Mendès France, who were not re-elected. Only the MRP, the Christian Democratic Party of Pierre Pflimlin, Robert Schuman and George Bidault, of the Center bloc and the Independents, headed by Antoine Pinay, of the Right succeeded in preserving, if not their political importance, at least their representation in the Assembly.

### **Future still uncertain**

To the extent that the Algerian war continues to impose throughout the foreseeable future heavy sacrifices on the country (recent measures of financial austerity are evidence of the fact), there is the danger of social conflict over the question of how these sacrifices are to be shared. Since the Communist Party remains an active force among the working class, it is not impossible that a Parliament clearly oriented to the Right will endeavor to assess responsibilities on it for these conflicts. Combined with a tendency present in the army to keep the homeland always at the disposition of Algeria, this tactic would then risk modifying significantly the democratic bases of France's political system; for by the classic phenomenon of all fusions, all opposition would be promptly grouped with the communists.

It is not at all sure that in such circumstances the prestige of General de Gaulle, weakened by the continuance of the war in Algeria and by the passage of time, would be sufficient to halt the evolution of France's government toward a Francoism or a Vichyism, that is to say, a paternal dictatorship.

Finally, the "de Gaulle revolution" can succeed in stabilizing the form of the French state only if it can put an end to the Algerian crisis and engender the climate for the emergence of truly democratic political forces capable of exercising political power even in the absence of General de Gaulle.

France has entered a period of change in its political history. No one can say today what the final outcome will be.

# Catholicism and the Intellectual

VICTOR C. FERKISS

FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS the American Catholic community has been engaged in a widespread and at times acrimonious discussion of its alleged intellectual incapacities and failures and the reasons therefor. The public airing of this matter has been deplored both by those who are fearful of the public relations consequences of the discussion and by those who deny the existence of any such failures. But the proponents of the thesis that American Catholics have failed to make their proportionate contribution to the intellectual life of the Church and nation have been too highly placed and too obviously well-intentioned for the debate to be stifled. Monsignor John Tracy Ellis' opening salvo<sup>1</sup> has been followed by frequent, if intermittent, attacks and counter-attacks across the pages of the Catholic and even the secular press. The latest salvo is a slim but important book, *American Catholic Dilemma*,<sup>2</sup> by Fordham sociology professor Thomas O'Dea.

Professor O'Dea, a specialist in the relatively new field of the sociology of religion, has operated at the higher lev-

els of both the Catholic and secular academic worlds. A former Fellow at the Behavioral Sciences Center at Stanford, he is a valued consultant on misology and the author of a well-received book on the Mormons.<sup>3</sup> He describes himself as a Parsonian in sociological orientation and, although his book (written originally as a study for the Catholic Commission on Intellectual and Cultural Affairs) suffers from a species of low-key writing common to semi-official pronouncements, it is nonetheless considerably more readable than most of the work of Professor Parsons and his disciples. It does, however, exhibit a Parsonian preference for speculation and system-building over empirical research; many who agree with much of what Professor O'Dea says will yet be hard put to demonstrate to dissenters the accuracy of his conclusions.

Professor O'Dea is interested not in whether Catholics have failed in the intellectual realm—he assumes they have—but why. He finds the explanation for their failure in the difference between the "manifest" and the "latent" content of Catholic culture patterns; that is, he maintains that while the Church is not officially and openly

<sup>1</sup> *American Catholics and the Intellectual Life*. The Heritage Foundation, Chicago, 1956.

<sup>2</sup> Sheed and Ward, New York, 1958, \$3.

Professor Ferkiss is currently doing research in political philosophy on a Rockefeller Foundation grant.

<sup>3</sup> *The Mormons*. University of Chicago Press, 1957.

anti-intellectual, Catholic society, especially in the United States, exhibits aspects and attitudes which militate against a flourishing intellectual life. These he labels formalism, authoritarianism, clericalism, moralism, and defensiveness. Unfortunately, Professor O'Dea's discussion of these attitudes is a prime example of the principal weakness of this book—an almost complete lack of factual data to support his generalizations.

Anyone who gets around in American Catholic circles is familiar with the phenomena of which O'Dea speaks. Anyone can easily see that such phenomena must of necessity inhibit intellectual creativity to some extent. And most of us know of particular cases where their influence for mediocrity can be definitely traced. Yet O'Dea's general judgments (and I share them) are at best educated guesses. Although Professor O'Dea cannot fairly be attacked for failing to do what in his short essay he does not set out to do, one can nonetheless lament the fact that we still lack any good empirical study of Catholic intellectuals. Such a study is obviously necessary before we can really say that we *know* what factors are actually responsible for motivating or inhibiting Catholics in their choice and pursuit of an intellectual vocation.<sup>4</sup>

The "dilemma" of Professor O'Dea's title is in essence the question of how much risk of alienation from Catholic

values<sup>5</sup> is worth taking in order to provide the preconditions of intellectual creativity. O'Dea's discussion of the interrelations between reason and faith, the problems posed by a false concept of other-worldliness and by most Catholics' lack of a sense of quest and mystery in the intellectual realm and elsewhere in life are especially good. Indeed, I found Professor O'Dea most enlightening when writing more as a theologian and religious philosopher than as a sociologist, though this is not to imply that he is not illuminating in the latter capacity. His attack on the myth that it is the Catholic's immigrant status which is primarily responsible for the alleged lack of Catholic intellectuals is particularly good; though the point should be obvious (only consider the achievements of the American Jewish community—or of lapsed Catholics of immigrant background for that matter), it nonetheless deserves repeating.

In the last analysis, however, any discussion of a Catholic intellectual "dilemma" is meaningful only if there is, in fact, something amiss about the relationship of American Catholics to the intellectual life. If something is indeed amiss this of course raises the questions of why things are not as they should be and what can be done to improve the situation. Professor O'Dea's book is an attempt to answer the sec-

<sup>4</sup> The forthcoming directory sponsored by the Catholic Commission on Intellectual and Cultural Affairs should provide some information on which better studies of the current Catholic intellectual situation can be based. I found, however, that for whatever good reasons the amount of personal background information requested was not as extensive as would be desirable for this purpose.

<sup>5</sup> I prefer this terminology to the more common "loss of faith" because the coming and going of the supernatural virtue of faith, however affected by the intellect, is ultimately a supernatural mystery and outside our direct concern in this discussion. The difficulty, of course, is that we know that faith is related to the intellectual climate but cannot precisely delineate this relationship because of the intrusion of grace into any system of socio-psychological causality.



ond question indirectly through answering the first by pointing to those factors which he considers to have brought about the "problem" of American Catholic intellectual failure. Some may object to O'Dea's airy statement that the "problem" is "almost too self-evident to need further documentation"—nothing in the social order is self-evident. It is not, however, lack of documentation which is at the root of the inadequacy of Professor O'Dea's treatment of his subject but rather his failure to define the "problem" in an empirically verifiable manner. Thus we do not even know what evidence we would need to substantiate—or refute—the book's underlying assumption.

What, in the first place, does the key term "intellectual" mean? Professor O'Dea adopts as a working definition Merle Curti's description of intellectuals as "those men and women whose main interest is the advancement of knowledge, or the clarification of cultural issues and public problems." This definition obviously raises at least as many questions as it answers; unless it is greatly refined, it is useless for determining which of our citizens ought to be classed as intellectuals. Does "main interest" refer to a given percentage (greater than half?) of a person's use of time? Or is it the percentage of his internal motivation which is at issue? As far as "clarification" of problems is concerned, there are many who would assert that a large number of self-styled intellectuals make their living through their obfuscation rather than their clarification. Are priests, doctors, and journalists intellectuals? If we are talking about

underdeveloped areas in Asia or Africa, we tend to assume so. In modern America, on the other hand, one can only answer maybe but probably not. Are lawyers intellectuals? If so, all of them, or only those with post-graduate training, or is there some other criterion? If a substantial proportion of lawyers are to be included this raises an interesting problem, since a "phenomenally high" number of Catholic college graduates become lawyers.<sup>6</sup> Should we automatically assume (as studies of Catholic intellectual failure usually do) that college professors or persons with Ph.D.'s are intellectuals?

Since we do not possess an adequate definition of who the intellectuals are, we obviously cannot know what proportion of intellectuals are Catholics or what proportion of Catholics intellectuals. Such statistics as we have, based on arbitrarily classifying some professions as intellectuals, are palpably unsatisfactory. It should also be pointed out that the bases for determining who in these professions are Catholics are wholly inadequate.<sup>7</sup> Many Catholics in the supposedly intellectual professions do not advertise their membership in the Church for various reasons.

The major difficulty bedeviling discussions of Catholic intellectual

<sup>6</sup> Ellis, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

<sup>7</sup> It should be unnecessary to note that it is absurd to talk about the number of Catholics in a certain field of endeavor solely on the basis of the number of graduates of Catholic colleges represented. None of the current Catholic presidential possibilities ever saw the inside of a Catholic college as a student. But this inadequate means for identifying who is a Catholic is constantly used for lack of better data. One can get some idea of Catholic representation among so-called "leaders" from *Who's Who*, but the only way to determine the gross proportion of Catholics in the professions labeled intellectual is to go out and ask.



achievement, such as *American Catholic Dilemma*, is a confusion among three related but distinct questions: 1. how many American intellectuals, however defined, are communicants of the Roman Catholic Church; 2. are American Catholic schools (colleges especially) as good as the best secular schools; and 3. is there an American Catholic intellectual life? As we have seen, the first question is largely unanswerable on the basis of current definitions and data. It is, however, intrinsically answerable, given adequate empirical yardsticks and sufficient research effort.

The second question is related to the first in that at some time in their lives many of our Catholic "intellectuals" have been involved as students or faculty with some kind of Catholic educational institution but this is far from the same question. Whether Catholic colleges are "good" or "bad" is a large and troubled question in its own right. Of the over 1,400 American colleges of all kinds now in existence about 90 per cent are intellectual slums anyway and while, for obvious historical and financial reasons (though not exclusively for these reasons<sup>9</sup>), none of the greatest American institutions is Catholic, no Catholic institution is likely to be found among the worst.<sup>9</sup>

Finally, as far as American Catholic intellectual life is concerned I am simply not sure what people mean by this term. Professor O'Dea concludes from an impressionistic perusal of shelves in Catholic bookstores and of publishers'

catalogues that "a genuine Catholic intellectual life is still dependent upon translations of European works or books of British origin." I may not live a genuine Catholic intellectual life by Professor O'Dea's standards (I suspect I do not) but I must confess that some of the most touted Catholic imports in the book field strike me as pretentious nonsense. This is not said in a spirit of chauvanism or "defensiveness." Many of the vaunted Catholic writers to whom I suspect Professor O'Dea is referring seem to me to lack respect for existential reality and to introduce religious considerations into areas of human knowledge where they are not directly relevant, thus engaging in a kind of "pan-theologistic" confusion of sacred and secular, a clericalism of the mind. Is there properly such a thing as "Catholic" intellectual life as distinguished from the intellectual life generally?

Obviously there is such a thing as Catholic theology. Whether there is a "Catholic" philosophy is a technical question with semantic overtones which we can simplify for our purposes by admitting that the answer is, in some sense, yes. In any event, American Catholic achievements and journals in these fields compare favorably with any in the world. But is there a Catholic physics? A Catholic biology? A Catholic music<sup>10</sup> or a Catholic linguistics? Is there a specifically Catholic political science or sociology?

These are issues which from time to time arise to disturb the slumbers of the

<sup>9</sup> One is reminded of the story of the public-spirited western tycoon who, after touring Harvard, asked the president, "How much would it cost to duplicate this in California?"

<sup>10</sup> One should never forget that the worst American colleges are freshwater teachers' colleges.

<sup>10</sup> Mr. O'Dea implies that there is a specifically Catholic music, by distinguishing between Catholics who are artists and "those who are both authentically Catholic in inspiration and authentically artistic in their work." p. 7, fn.

Catholic academic community. The underlying assumption of Professor O'Dea and others who have dealt with this matter seems to be that the question of whether there is a Catholic intellectual life among American physicists and musicians is somehow a question distinct from and in addition to the question of whether informed practicing Catholics of intellectual stature are prominent in these professions. When such a distinction is applied, it of course further reduces the number of those who can be classified as Catholic intellectuals.

If one concentrates on Catholics who are intellectuals, however defined, rather than on some kind of coherent Catholic intellectual community, there will undoubtedly be found to be more Catholic intellectuals in America than is commonly thought. Nonetheless, it is true that few of the key positions in the American intellectual world—positions which confer upon their holders the opportunity to influence the values of American life generally—are held by Catholics. The reasons for this lack may with further study, however, be found to reside not in the American Catholic community but in the American intellectual community itself.

I know, for instance, of no pertinent socio-ideological study of the book and magazine publishing industry in the United States—of who and what is published and why—a matter of considerable importance, since prestige in the intellectual world is largely a matter of where something is published and what the critics say about it. Since Catholic values often differ significantly from those held by the secular world, it is only to be expected that the work

of Catholic writers will have considerable difficulty in securing both publication and subsequent critical acclaim.

We do have some evidence about those factors which militate against Catholic eminence in the American academic community. A recent study<sup>11</sup> indicates that academic prestige is a virtual monopoly of the faculty and graduates of a small number of dominant secular universities. Taking one's degree at a Catholic graduate school or joining the faculty of a Catholic institution is apparently a one-way ticket to academic oblivion.<sup>12</sup>

Professor O'Dea's failure to distinguish among the various facets of the problem with which he is concerned is compounded by the fact that we lack any adequate study of what the role of the intellectual in America<sup>13</sup> or, for that matter, in any society, is or ought to be. What Professor O'Dea has done very well is to show us why the intellectual is ill at ease in American Catholic society and why, given the tensions between reason and faith, this is inevitable. But we should remember that this is in many ways not a specifically Catholic problem; all societies live by something analogous to faith, and in all societies some intellectuals (though by no means all) are trouble-makers. Sociologist Edward Shils recently wrote:

<sup>11</sup>Theodore Caplow and Reece J. McGee, *The Academic Marketplace*, Basic Books, New York, 1958.

<sup>12</sup>However, this should not obscure the fact that working conditions in virtually all Catholic institutions are such as to make research and publication on the part of their faculty almost impossible.

<sup>13</sup>There is an increasing literature in this area. My own views (at the time at least) appear in "The Intellectual in American Society," *Southwest Review*, XLIII (1958), pp. 66-70.

Intellectuals are indispensable to any society, not just to industrial society, and the more complex the society the more indispensable they are. An effective collaboration between intellectuals and the authorities which govern society is a requirement for order and continuity in public life and for the integration of the wider reaches of the laity into society. Yet, the original impulse to intellectual performance, and the traditions to which it has given rise and which are sustained by the institutions through which intellectual performance is made practicable generate tensions between intellectuals and the laity, high and low. This tension can never be eliminated, either by a complete consensus between the laity and the intellectuals or by the complete ascendancy of the intellectuals over the laity.

Within these two extreme and impossible alternatives, a wide variety of forms of consensus and dissensus in the relations of the intellectuals and the ruling powers of society have existed. The discovery and the achievement of the optimum balance of civility and intellectual creativity are the task of the statesman and the responsible intellectual.<sup>14</sup>

Mr. O'Dea's book is the work of just such a responsible intellectual as envisaged in the passage quoted. He seeks to further the creation of the requisite balance of civility and creativity by deepening our understanding of the problems of the intellectual and of society in the particular context of modern American Catholic life. For this we all owe him a debt of gratitude.

*American Catholic Dilemma* is a book well worth reading; it is all the more to be regretted that the author's practical suggestions are so few. He does note that the *Index* is a major inhibitor of intellectual curiosity among Catholics and evinces joy at what he believes to be moves toward its liberal-

ization.<sup>15</sup> This, it seems to me, is a point which should be constantly urged, if the mind of the Church on this matter is ever to change.



Professor O'Dea's major recommendation, however, is that Catholics should devote more effort to the study of the causes of their alleged intellectual inferiority. Here I can agree with him only in part. Study, yes—this matter should engage the attention not only of sociologists but of canonists with responsibilities in those areas where their actions can aid or inhibit Catholic creativity. But the great majority of would-be Catholic intellectuals will be better advised to give the problem we have been discussing a minimum of consideration. What we most need are not more experts on the problem of why there are no Catholic intellectuals but more working Catholic intellectuals. The way to produce them is not by prolonged morbid introspection but by writing more and better books, painting more pictures, studying more mathematics or physics or Orientalia or whatever. If we go about our proper business, as intellectuals, the problem will be self-solving in time; as Eric Gill once said, forget about Art, be a good craftsman, for "Art looks after Himself."

<sup>15</sup>p. 44. Alas, I read the news dispatch he cites differently and believe it pressages simply a revision and updating of the lists of banned works, making them more contemporary. The implications are as obvious as they are unfortunate.

<sup>14</sup>"The Intellectuals and the Powers," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, I (1958), pp. 5-22.

# Christian Trade Unions The European Scene

GEORGES JARLOT, S.J.

*(This is Part I of a two-part article in which Father Jarlot discusses the origins and development of Europe's Christian Trade Unions.)*

INVITED IN THE interest of greater mutual understanding to explain to the readers of SOCIAL ORDER the ideas and practices of Christian trade unions, I prefer to restrict my analysis to the movement in France and to offer some observations on the *Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens* (C.F.T.C.), its history and current tendencies.

In explaining the C.F.T.C. I do not claim that its pattern can or should be applied elsewhere. Quite the contrary. Just as the American—or even the English—type of trade union is impossible in France, at least under present conditions, so a Christian trade union movement seems neither possible nor opportune in the United States, at least now. In questions of trade union policy, as in all questions of political tactics, prudence is as indispensable as justice; prudence, it is important to keep in mind, requires respect for the concrete circumstances of place and time. Thus, the question presents itself differently in Germany with its

*Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund* (D.G.-B.) and in Italy with its *Associazione Christiana dei Lavoratori Italiani*, in Belgium with the *Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens de Belgique*, again with the *Congrès du Travail du Canada* (C.T.C.) and the *Confédération des Travailleurs Catholiques* (C. T. C. C.) and in France with its *Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens* (C.F.T.C.).

Another disclaimer: I would not want any observations of mine to be interpreted as a judgment in the controversy over the "Right-to-Work" laws in the United States. Unfamiliar with the problems involved, I would not think of expressing an opinion on the question.

It is probably no easier for an American trade union member to understand the case for Christian trade unions than it is for a French worker to see how his freedom to choose his own union would be compatible with the union shops and the exclusive bargaining agencies which characterize the American labor movement.

Let it be understood at the outset that Christian trade unions are neither ecclesiastical nor sectarian organizations. In Central Africa and Vietnam,

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for example, autonomous unions of the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions include numbers of Moslems or Buddhists.<sup>1</sup> Christian trade unions are as jealous of their independence of the clergy as they are of political parties. Priests have lectured in their training courses but only at the invitation of the unions. In France the hierarchy assigns chaplains to the Workers' Catholic Action organization (A.C.O.) but not to the C.F.T.C. In fact, the relations between the A.C.O. and the C.F.T.C. are not always as cordial as one might wish.

What, then, is the goal of the C.F.T.C.? Its history, with its clear evolution from a markedly sectarian and clerical character to one of religious independence, gives us the answer.

In its origins the movement was admittedly denominational. During an audience, Pope Leo XIII had asked the Superior General of the Christian Brothers to add activities for young men to their work for children. As early as 1883 Brother Hiéron had established an employment bureau for his former students. Known as the "Society of St. Benedict Labre," it gradually evolved into a trade union. To become a member, one had "to be a Catholic and a credit to the Faith because of a good reputation." The first congress of this inchoate trade union movement

declared on December 20, 1904:

If we have been stubbornly determined to remain identifiably Catholic, . . . it is in order that the working-class world may appreciate that the ancient commandment of the love of Christ dominates all fields of human activity and permits of no exceptions.

### Strength through numbers

As early as 1889, however, the movement had begun to lose its purely denominational character. It recognized that "for a trade union to be prosperous it must be strong and for it to be strong, it must have a large membership." It became necessary, therefore, to accept members who were not practicing Catholics. On January 1, 1914, the Commercial and Industrial Employees Union of Paris had 7,730 members—few, to be sure, but among them were Jules Zirnheld and Gaston Tessier, founders of the Christian Trade Union movement. These men deserve special mention; without them the movement would have accomplished little.

To understand this early period of the Christian trade unions we must review the social climate of those times. The first Congress of Working Men, held in Paris in 1876, had denounced strikes and had recommended conciliation and harmonious relations between capital and labor. At Lyons the following year Jules Guesde became the spokesman for a collectivist-minded minority which demanded the nationalization of productive wealth and the destruction, by a social revolution, of what it termed the "bourgeois" state. At the Marseille Congress the following year this minority had become the majority. In 1883 a Revolutionary Workers' Party under the leadership of Jules Guesde and Brousse came into

<sup>1</sup> In March of last year a speaker on the Vatican Radio urged the formation of Christian trade unions in Africa and Asia, citing the example of the success of such unions in Vietnam as evidence that they can be fostered in countries where Christians are a minority. The speaker declared: "With a Christian trade union a spiritual activity penetrates the people and leads to their development in line with the dignity of the human being, according to what has been laid down by the social doctrine of the Church."



existence. The mass of the working class, however, was unaffected by these developments: the over-complicated ideas of Marxism had then won only the intellectuals.

At the same time Fernand Pelloutier had organized his *Bourses du Travail*. (These specifically French institutions serve two purposes: a market-place where workers seeking a job and employers seeking workers meet—and, in addition, centers for educational programs etc.) Pelloutier wanted to provide workers with a place and opportunity for the quiet discussion of, and acquisition of information about, the problems of their work and trade. The idea was to withdraw the working class from the influence of the politicians and to indoctrinate them with the philosophy of "direct action" and thus to create "a society of proud and free men."

This goal was much closer to that of Proudhon (and especially to that of Georges Sorel) than to that of Marx. "Direct action" is one of Sorel's myths; it is at once an idea and a hope, the whole notion being suffused with emotion and passion in order to sustain the combativeness of the working class in their battle for independence. The hoped-for "Great Day" would be the general strike, paralyzing the bourgeois economic system and destroying its political structures as a preliminary to the seizure of power and the establishment of a new Commune, a kind of municipal socialism. While awaiting that triumph, the hope of the "Great Day" facilitated the effort toward the total education of the working class in its particular line of work and especially in its moral outlook. Like Sorel, Pel-

loutier was a moralist. Both wanted to form an elite prepared for the tasks of the future. It is precisely for this reason that "direct action" is one of Sorel's myths.

### Without disguise

Meanwhile the trade unions were developing. The closing of the *Bourses du Travail* of Paris in 1893 provided them with an occasion to throw off their disguise. In that year they claimed 400,000 members, a number which grew to 950,000 by 1908. The unions were federated vertically according to industries and trades. There were 68 national federations in 1908. Naturally enough, it was proposed to unite the working class by merging the *Bourses du Travail* and the trade union federations, a step which became possible only after the death of Pelloutier. At the 1902 Congress of Montpellier 165 delegates from 56 *Bourses* accepted the proposal, while 373 trade union representatives committed 29 federations. Thus it was that the *Confédération Générale du Travail* was established.

With the Charter of Amiens (1906) the new organization defined its policies. These found their inspiration in the doctrines of Proudhon, with his notion of the workshop replacing the government, and in those of Sorel, with his advocacy of direct action resulting in the seizure of economic power through the general strike. The Charter of Amiens announced at the same time

the trade union member's complete liberty to participate in any other forms of the class struggle corresponding to his philosophical and political convictions, with the single restriction that the member must not introduce into trade unions the opinions he proclaims elsewhere.



In point of fact, up to 1914 the C.G.T. continued to be divided between two tendencies, the reformist and the revolutionary. The first school, advocating what in the United States would be called business unionism, concentrated on goals that could be achieved immediately, preserving the idea of the general strike only as a background myth to maintain the militancy of the working class.

For the leaders of the revolutionary wing aggravating the class struggle



was the primary purpose of the organization. In their view the destruction of the bourgeois state and of the privileged interests it protected was the first order of business. Partial victories, they held, are of value only to the extent that they contribute to the morale of the masses. Only direct action satisfied their revolutionary ideals. As Griffühles declared in 1906, "I joined the trade union movement to battle against the property-owning class, the agency of my enslavement, and against the state, its natural protector and beneficiary."

It will not be surprising, then, to note that the period from 1906 to the outbreak of World War I was filled with violent and frequently bloody strikes, many of them put down only by military force. The Congress of Marseille in 1908 had called for a general strike in case of war, the trade

union movement being at that time anti-militarist and even anti-patriotic. It was only after the Agadir incident in 1911 and the failure to organize simultaneous manifestations against the Balkan War in London, Berlin, Paris and Vienna that Léon Jouhaux said: "We declare clearly and definitely that we are against desertion in time of war."

### **Towards a Christian union**

This background should aid in understanding the doctrinal attitude of the Christian trade union before the first World War. The *Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens* came into existence as a federation in 1919. At Pentecost the next year representatives from 578 locals, totalling 145,000 members, attended its first congress. For a comparison it might be noted that the C.G.T. in 1914 had boasted less than 350,000 members, of whom scarcely 150,000, according to Léon Jouhaux, accepted a common body of ideas on the nature of trade unionism.

The C.F.T.C. constitution, adopted on February 7, 1920, declared that the organization "proposed to found its activity on the social doctrine outlined in the encyclical *Rerum Novarum*." It expressed the conviction that

social peace, necessary for the country's prosperity and trade union organization, itself indispensable for the achieving of this peace, cannot be realized except by the application of the principles of justice and Christian charity.

It announced that it would work for the necessary reformation of institutions not by class warfare, but by education and by the cooperation of the parties involved in the productive

process, these being associated in common committees where the independence and the rights of each party would be respected. Finally, and this is a capital point, the constitution declared:

In limiting its activities strictly to the defense and the formulation of the interests of the working man, the Confederation invites the assistance of religious, moral and intellectual forces capable of fostering the vocational and moral development of the workers.

The slogan which the C.F.T.C. adopted, a familiar phrase of French Social Catholicism, is revealing: "*le syndicat libre dans la profession organisée*." By a free union is understood the worker's complete liberty to join or not to join the organization, to give his allegiance to the union of his choice; it means democratic elections throughout the movement from the locals up to the federation; it means effective control of policies by an executive committee and of effective control of executive committees by the members.

### **For a corporate society**

The phrase "*profession organisée*" brings us back to the old corporate idea of Social Catholicism before 1914. The supposition is that diverse lines of economic activity within the national economy have organized themselves on different levels—local, regional and national—into "*conseils corporatifs*" or into "*commissions mixtes*." These committees are composed of representatives of employers and workers in equal numbers. Apart from questions concerning only the workers as a group or the employers alone, these commissions would have jurisdiction over the entire industry or business—and this in both the economic and social areas. The settlement of questions arising be-

tween labor and employers would have first place: wages, hours and conditions of work, security of employment, social security and the arbitration of grievances. The proper domain of these "*commissions mixtes*" would embrace everything that is the object of collective bargaining in the United States. The purpose of this proposal was to interest the working class; through these committees it would have some voice in the direction of the firm and of the industry on both the regional and the national levels.

Because of historical circumstances all this has remained illusory, but it was part of the social philosophy of the C.F.T.C. expressed in the slogan, "the free union in the organized trade." The formula envisaged at once the freedom of the trade union and social peace.

The C.F.T.C. in its first federal congress (1920) proposed joint committees on every level of industry; with their growth and increased influence these committees, it was felt, could become the representative bodies of the organized trade locally, regionally and nationally. Such a plan in no wise intended to exclude "the energetic support by all legitimate means of the just demands of the workers through a common program with all of the legally-constituted trade unions." The phrase reserved the right to strike when peaceful solutions of conciliation and arbitration failed. It also reserved to the trade union movement its complete independence of all political or religious forces.

Students of Catholic social history will recall one of the early challenges to the doctrinal position of the C.F.T.C. In 1924 the *Consortium du Textile Roubaix-Tourcoing*, a section of

the Association of Christian Employers of the North, had denounced the C.F.T.C. to the Holy See, accusing it of Marxism, of collaboration with the enemies of the Church and of supporting state socialism. The reply of the Sacred Congregation of the Council on March 5, 1929, is likewise familiar: "Certain of the allegations are exaggerated, others, the more serious ones, attributing to the unions a Marxist and socialist spirit, are entirely without foundation and are unjust." The reply acknowledged in passing that in the heat of battle the Christian unions had not always employed temperate language and moderate tactics.

The insistence of the C.F.T.C. on pluralism in the labor movement was deepened by the series of events which reached their climax in 1936. In the aftermath of World War I and after the failure of the political strikes of 1920 all hope of a seizure of power by the working class was abandoned in France as well as throughout Western Europe. The "Great Day" and the "soviets" had to be postponed indefinitely. The *Confédération Générale du Travail* found itself divided into two wings: one was the *Confédération du Général Travail Unitaire* (C.G.T.U.), a member of the communist Third International and obedient to Moscow's orders and, beside it, the old C.G.T., faithful to Léon Jouhaux, now a moderate, reformist trade union and claiming to be the continuation of the C.G.T. tradition.

This was the situation up to 1936. Until the formation of the Popular Front in 1935 and its victory in the election of the following year, the communists were a minority and the legiti-

mate trade unionists the larger group. From October, 1934, discussions looking toward the reconstruction of the old C.G.T. had been taking place. The fusion was realized with great difficulty at the Toulouse Congress in January, 1936, with each side maintaining its characteristic ideology. The former Unity group extolled the Marxist "democratic centralism" doctrine; Jouhaux's followers continued their advocacy of federalism and the doctrine of Proudhon. The pro-communist wing advocated collaboration with the government of the Popular Front, while the opposite wing continued its opposition to all government and maintained its mistrust of all politicians.

### The "sit down" movement

Then the strikes of June, 1936 began. These had a new character: they involved the occupation of the factories. This "sit down" movement, starting in the countryside, had reached Paris; it had developed among the working masses in an atmosphere of victory and even of gaiety; it had attained a significance out of all proportion to the numbers of trade union members involved; it had escaped control of union officials. France was at that moment perhaps on the eve of a proletarian revolution and the authority of Maurice Thorez was needed to prevent it. "You have to know how to end a strike," he declared. For, if the situation seemed ripe for a political revolution, economic conditions were certainly unfavorable; a disaster would have followed in which the working class especially would have suffered.

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*To be concluded next month.*

# The Future of Nuclear Power

JAMES F. FAIRMAN

The present attempt to convert nuclear energy into an economically feasible source of electric power is a swords-into-plowshares project of transcendent import to our civilized world.

Our studies indicate, unfortunately, that only four in ten Americans are aware of this effort. Only about one in ten can describe with some accuracy the physical means by which the controlled release of atomic energy can be translated into electric power. Presumably only a much smaller group is aware of the weight of the word "economically" in the phrase above, the point toward which the following pages are addressed. For this article is a report on the progress made by Consolidated Edison Company of New York in the three years since it undertook to employ a nuclear reactor in its business of supplying electricity to the consumer. To place the venture in its proper context, the pre-atomic economics of the industry must first be described. Only then can a tentative evaluation be made of the impact and of the problems of the new technology.

As Ayres and Scarlott have pointed out,<sup>1</sup> there is something about the own-

ership of a car which results in economic anaesthesia. An individual who will hesitate to spend \$3.50 on a book or \$1.98 for a tool to speed a tedious home repair task will, out of his other pocket, gladly spend nine cents and more per mile to dash about the countryside on errands of folly in a 3,600-pound juggernaut. Sociologists tell us this numbness to economic reality pervades our entire culture.

On a more modest scale, consider the automatic clothes washer, until quite recently a prestige item but now declared a physical necessity by public opinion in the long rows of contemporary housing. The individual machine is used an average of twelve and a half hours a month, 1.7 per cent of the total time. To make its operation possible, something less than a half pound of coal must be burned in an electric generating station for every load of wash run through the machine. To translate the heat of the coal into electricity, about \$80 worth of machinery is required at the generating station. To get the power from the station to a point on the street in front of the house, about \$150 worth of wire, transformers and poles is needed.

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<sup>1</sup> *Energy Sources—The Wealth of the World*. By Eugene Ayres and Charles A. Scarlott. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1952.

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The writer is Senior Vice President, Consolidated Edison Company of New York.

The capital investment of \$230 made by the utility company in this typical case very nearly matches the investment in the washing machine made by the family. But the utility company keeps detailed records of its costs. While the family smiles benignly at its washing machine (or frowns if the mechanism becomes erratic), the utility company knows that taxes, interest, insurance and depreciation are running on its investment at the rate of \$33.35 a year.

In addition, of course, the coal must be bought and the employees who operate the machinery must be paid. Occasional spare parts for repairs and bookkeeping charges are involved as well as a modicum for the stockholders who make the operation possible in the first place. It is one of the hidden wonders of our era that the family can buy electricity to do a load of wash for a penny or two. The secret, of course, is diversity in point of time. The equipment used at one instant to supply the washing machine is used at another hour to operate a television set, again to pump the community's water supply, again to light the streets at night.

When the electric industry was launched in 1882, its business was restricted to the sale of artificial light. By the turn of the century the industry had small motors to sell as well as improved lamp bulbs. In 20 years there were better motors, prototype refrigerators and electric corn popping devices. We are still moving through an expanding cornucopia of applications of electric energy in homes, commerce and industry.

Back in the 1920s, to my personal knowledge, our more foresighted leaders

recognized that we would become purveyors of energy to civilization. The clean, flexible and comparatively safe form of energy that is electricity ensured public acceptance. Its economic ability to handle additional load at favorable incremental costs made it a safe financial wager for the long term. Its growth, which averages a compound 6 per cent per year, is a built-in guarantee of continuously improved efficiency.

In all this pleasant picture the only thing we needed was a constant supply of raw energy to process into electricity. The idea of dipping into limited reserves for fuel is basically repugnant to the conservative individual. Development of the petrochemical industry made many wonder whether the chemical bounty stored in coal was being properly applied when this treasure was simply burned and its potential in aspirin tablets and artificial dyes went up the chimney for all time.

Fuel reserve predictions are nearly as numerous as the reserves themselves; indeed, the prediction business has been notoriously hazardous since the Delphic oracle with her ambiguous verses went out of fashion. In the field of fuel economics, however, we can make certain assumptions which, taken together, have the net result of a prediction.

Fossil fuels (coal, oil and natural gas) exist in finite quantities. The price of these fuels reflects supply and demand as well as the value of the use to which the fuels are put. There is not enough renewable energy in the form of timber crops and flowing rivers to power civilization at its present energy consumption level and the lack will be even more apparent at the higher energy levels toward which we are moving. Therefore,

the relative price of fossil fuel will rise.

Atomic power, in prospect ever since Einstein's announcement of  $E=mc^2$  in 1905, is the obvious next step in the energy pattern of mankind. Thanks to the work of many men in many countries the theory has become a fact. Four-fifths of the energy liberated by a nucleus in fission appears as heat. This heat is equivalent to heat in any other form and the electricity which it can generate in a steam turbine-electric generator cycle is indistinguishable from electricity generated with conventional fuels.

Given the physical fact, we are left with the economic matters unsolved. How much will this nuclear electricity cost?

The military value of the bomb explains why the development had to be a government monopoly. As Kissinger points out,<sup>2</sup> a chain of decisions following the close of active hostilities in World War II makes the nuclear weapon inevitably an integral part of continuing foreign policies for the United States and the other great powers.

This continuing military necessity has kept those of us who want to go into the plowshare business in the dark on one fairly vital point. We still have no definite knowledge of the true economic cost of nuclear fuel. With a knowledge of unit costs and published budget figures, the argument runs, one would not have to be an expert in espionage to calculate the bomb production potential of our installations.

<sup>2</sup> *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*. By Henry A. Kissinger. Harper & Brothers, for the Council of Foreign Relations, New York, 1957. See, also, his article, "Nuclear Testing and the Problem of Peace," in *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1958.

With the government in possession of the nuclear material and its sole supplier by law, we must accept its published price list. We have, however, no indication as to where economics stops and policy takes over in the dictation of these published prices.

At the outset of our direct interest in nuclear power, following passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, fuel costs were not the only hazy items on the budget. We were caught in a circle. No one could quote us a real price on fuel elements since there was no open market for these items. No one was interested in reprocessing the used elements (primarily a job for a chemist), since there was no supply of used elements that needed processing. Everyone in the quotation business was making a price not only on a first-of-a-kind object but also on the assumption that the object would be the only-of-a-kind.

In early 1955 a first step to break this circle was taken by the late H. R. Searing, then president and chief executive officer of Consolidated Edison, the electric utility that serves New York City. Mr. Searing told the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy on February 10 that his company expected to purchase a nuclear reactor for the production of electricity and on March 22 a formal application for authority to construct such a plant was filed with the Atomic Energy Commission.

An easily read book on nuclear engineering such as the volume by Schwenk and Shannon<sup>3</sup> gives an appre-

<sup>3</sup> *Nuclear Power Engineering*. By Henry C. Schwenk and Robert H. Shannon, edited by B. G. A. Skrotski. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1957.



ciation of the design and construction problems of nuclear reactors. The fairly well understood mechanics of heat release and transfer are complicated by the nuclear factors, and the metallurgical difficulties surrounding any combination of heat and metal are compounded by the overriding considerations of safety under any and all possible circumstances.

Our project has had its ups and downs since it was initiated, but the unit is under construction now at Indian Point on the east bank of the Hudson River some 34 miles north of New York's Times Square. A \$90 million facility, it will have a gross capacity of 275,000 electrical kilowatts, enough to supply the domestic requirements of a million New Yorkers. The nuclear reactor will be fueled with Uranium-235 and with Thorium-232. The latter is not of itself fissionable but when it is exposed to the neutrons inside an active reactor core it is transmuted into Uranium-233, a fissionable isotope.

Heat from the reactor will be picked up in four pressurized water loops and will be used to turn boiler water to steam. This steam will be superheated in separate oil-fired superheaters in order to give us modern steam conditions at the turbine throttle. About 60 per cent of the energy in the steam will come from the nuclear reactor and the remainder from the superheaters. We expect the plant to be completed in 1960.

Reverting to the typical washing machine used as an illustration at the outset, our present figures indicate that the cost of labor at the Indian Point station will be nearly identical with the cost in a station burning conventional

fuel. With the first loading we insert in the reactor, our fuel costs will run about 40 per cent over fuel costs in a comparable new conventionally fired station but this differential is expected to narrow with successive loadings.

The same \$150 worth of wire, transformers and poles will be needed to carry power from Indian Point to the washing machine but instead of \$80 worth of generating equipment at the station, Indian Point will require \$140 worth. The extra plant investment will boost the fixed charges in taxes, interest, insurance and depreciation from \$33.35 a year with conventional fuel to \$42.05 with nuclear fuel. Unlike the fuel cost, which is expected to improve along with fuel processing techniques, this 20 per cent surcharge in fixed costs is tied to Indian Point's first unit for its useful life. It is the price tag of progress.

Before the impression is conveyed through this arithmetical manipulation that we are dealing with only a few dollars and change, let me add that in the case of Indian Point the plant is costing \$35 million over the price of a conventionally fueled unit. That \$35 million investment has been combed in every direction by a skilled and experienced staff in an attempt to reduce the sum.

If we were to start building a duplicate version of Indian Point tomorrow, we could count on saving more than \$10 million invested in research and development for this design. With a few years of experience in actual operation of the plant, we are sure the remaining \$25 million could be reduced; by how much or in which areas the savings could be effected we

cannot say without the operating experience.

We have never regretted nor considered premature our decision to bring nuclear power out of the laboratory and into the marketplace. Most of the electric utility industry has followed the same procedure. In addition to our installation in New York, major power reactors for the production of electricity are under construction in Illinois, Massachusetts and Michigan. Units are being operated on a test basis at several government laboratories and in installations in California and Pennsylvania. Additional units are being pushed through the design and planning stages for use in Alaska, California, Florida, Nebraska, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and South Dakota.

The technological problems as well as the economic questions of nuclear power will be solved by the actual construction and operation of plants. Fuel costs, including the whole cycle from mining through disposal of waste products, will become more realistic as the volume handled increases and as standardization progresses.

By adopting a multi-faceted approach to nuclear power (no two of the reactors under construction or in an advanced state of design are exactly similar), we have mounted a broad attack on the economic unknowns of nuclear power.

Some of the original unknowns have already been uncovered. We know enough today to be able to state that considerable research and development work remains to be done before nuclear power can compete economically with power from conventional fuels in a low fuel cost, high energy use society such

as the one we have in the United States.

We still do not know whether conventional fuel costs will rise soon to the point where nuclear power will become competitive even at its present price level, or whether eventual developments will lower the cost of nuclear power sufficiently until it can compete directly with conventional fuel at the present price level.

This, of course, is the picture for the United States. In Europe a greater paucity of fuels might make an earlier introduction of nuclear power more economically feasible.<sup>4</sup>

### Patient confidence

In addition to its financing, its manpower and its raw materials, the nuclear industry needs another essential in order to answer its economic questions properly; it needs time. With a sufficient supply of this last commodity, the industry is certain it can adapt nuclear fuel to the production of economic electric power, just as it was certain only a few years ago that it could employ nuclear fuel for the production of practical amounts of electric power.

<sup>4</sup> The current issue of the quarterly of the British Information Services reports that by the 1970s nuclear reactors should be producing half of Britain's electricity. "In fact, the cost of power from the 1962 plants is expected to be roughly equal to that from coal or oil-fired plants, provided that the nuclear plants can operate on an 80 per cent load factor, that is to say, as continuously as possible." *British Affairs*, II (December, 1958), p. 153.

Arnold Toynbee's successor in the chair of history at London's Royal Institute of International Affairs, Geoffrey Barraclough, sees vast potentialities for nuclear energy in the underdeveloped countries. Speaking at San Francisco last December, Professor Barraclough listed overpopulation as the biggest problem facing mankind today but asserted that the most promising solution is nuclear energy.—Ed.

# Books

## ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT

William J. Kenealy, S.J. .

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DESPITE THE MODESTY of its title and because of the incisiveness of its argument and the wealth of its cited source material, this brief book<sup>1</sup> deserves the serious attention of students of legal and political science, indeed of all who are genuinely interested in the difficult and pressing problems of civil liberties in the United States.

The book consists of three Gaspar G. Bacon Lectures delivered at Boston University in 1956 by Henry S. Drinker of the Philadelphia bar. The author, an eminent constitutional lawyer, divides his material into an introductory lecture on the principles of constitutional interpretation and their application to the four freedoms of the First Amendment; the second lecture deals with free speech, press, assembly and petition, with particular application to peaceful picketing by labor unions and to street preaching by Jehovah Witnesses; the third and final lecture deals with problems of religious freedom, with particular application to "released-time" programs and the meaning and implications of the "establishment" clause.

The first lecture, after citing Justice Holmes' theory of legal interpre-


tation, "We do not inquire what the Legislature meant, we ask only what the Statute means," *Collected Legal Papers*, p. 207, and Justice Frankfurter's agreement, "What was submitted for ratification was his proposal, not his speech," *Adamson v California*, 332 U. S. 46, 64, (1947), leads to the author's highly significant observation that:

It is a poor cause that cannot find some plausible support in legislative history, and hence it is dangerous to qualify the formal text by expressions of legislators in letters, speeches, reports or debates which often reflect merely the tentative view of the legislature, and leave misinterpretations unanswered lest more definitive statements imperil the chance of passage. These principles are particularly applicable in the interpretation of a constitutional amendment whose adoption requires the approval not only of Congress but of three-fourths of the states. For example, the legislature of New York cannot be presumed to have known what Madison said or thought of the meaning of "an establishment of religion." What the Framers said about the First Amendment is interesting but not, as Justices Black and Rutledge have apparently contended, decisive of its meaning.

After discussing and illustrating the criteria for discerning the historical meaning of constitutional provisions, the author carefully emphasizes that the historical meaning so discovered is not that of an inflexible statute; it is rather that of a Constitution designed

<sup>1</sup> SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE FOUR FREEDOMS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT. By Henry S. Drinker, Boston University Press, 69 pp. \$3.

not merely for the end of the 18th century, but "as fundamental law for 'ages to come,' under new conditions which the Framers must have realized they could not foresee." He illustrates the adaptability of constitutional provisions to changing conditions by a scholarly case-to-case analysis of the judicial origin, development and qualification, of the "clear and present danger rule" governing the interpretation of freedom of speech in the First Amendment.



The author then turns to the question as to *how* the freedoms of the First Amendment, which restricted the powers of the federal government only, were given protection from abridgment by the states after the adoption of the XIVth Amendment in 1868. He explains the four theories which contended for judicial acceptance.

The *Slaughter House Cases*, 83 U. S. 36 (1873), rejected the theory that all rights belonging to citizens of free governments are "privileges and immunities" protected by the first clause of the XIVth Amendment. *Twining v New Jersey*, 211 U. S. 78 (1908), rejected the second theory that the rights specified in the Bill of Rights are such "privileges and immunities." *Palko v Connecticut*, 302 U. S. 319 (1939), rejected the third theory that all the rights specified in the Bill of Rights are "incorporated" into the "due process" clause

of the XIVth Amendment. Finally *Wolf v Colorado*, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), after summarizing the earlier cases, reaffirmed the rule formulated by Justice Cardozo in the *Palko Case*, namely, that the four freedoms of the First Amendment are protected against state infringement not because they are in the First Amendment or in the Bill of Rights or in any other specified schedule of civil rights but because the "due process" clause of the XIVth Amendment prohibits the states from violating "those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions" and which are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Wherefore, of course, the states are precluded from arbitrary and capricious restrictions upon freedom of religion, of speech, of the press and of peaceable assembly and petition.

Mr. Drinker concludes his introductory lecture with a severe criticism of the "preferred position" theory of First Amendment rights. This theory, advocated by Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge, would substitute for the usual presumption of constitutionality in favor of ordinary federal or state legislation an unusual presumption of unconstitutionality against any legislation which qualifies or restricts the exercise of First Amendment rights, thus giving them a "preferred position." The author's own conviction is expressed as follows:

In his concurring opinion in *Kovacs v Cooper*, 336 U. S. 77 (1949), Justice Frankfurter took the occasion to state that the preferred position principle had "never commended itself to a majority of this Court," stating that in his opinion it is a "mischievous phrase" which has "uncritically crept into some recent opinions." He terms it a misleading and deceptive

formula, the principle being merely that "in considering what interests are so fundamental as to be enshrined in the Due Process Clause, those liberties of the individual which history has attested of the indispensable conditions of an open as against a closed society come to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements.

The second lecture, dealing with free speech, press, assembly and petition, tackles the controversial issues of peaceful picketing by labor unions and street preaching by Jehovah Witnesses. Mr. Drinker is not overly enthusiastic about labor unions or Jehovah Witnesses. Nevertheless, reviewing the major picketing cases involving various state statutes from *Thornhill v Alabama*, 310 U. S. 88 (1940), to *Plumbers' Union v Grabam*, 345 U. S. 192 (1953), he shows how the Court has shifted its appraisal of peaceful picketing from the abstract concept of free speech *as such* to the more realistic concept of free speech *plus*, i.e., a "hybrid" of speech and economic pressure. The author says:

There is, however, in picketing, no chance or expectation of intellectual conquest or of any real contest between ideas, any more than there was in the medieval "Trial by Battle," where the litigants fought it out in the arena, and if the defendant survived until the sun went down, he won. Where free speech is not conducive to the development of truth, the theory on which the First Amendment rests no longer applies.

Reviewing the major Jehovah Witnesses' cases from *Lovell v Griffin*, 303 U. S. 444 (1938), to *Saia v New York*, 334 U. S. 558 (1948), the author complains that the Court has consistently appraised the preaching of the Witnesses from the abstract concept of free speech and religion *as such* and has so

far failed to appraise realistically the rights of privacy of unwilling listeners. Mr. Drinker claims that Hayden C. Covington, the very able attorney for the Witnesses, has been able to persuade the Court "to take on itself the primary and direct responsibility for the regulation of problems which . . . could be better handled at the local level." He concludes:

It remains to be seen whether the Court, as now constituted, will retain this responsibility, or will begin to retreat as it has done in the labor cases discussed previously. Proper protection of the rights of Jehovah's Witnesses does not require the neglect of those of fellow citizens.

The final lecture deals with the "most controversial and controverted" clause of the First Amendment, "respecting an establishment of religion." It analyzes the New Jersey bus case, *Everson v Board of Education*, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); the Illinois released-time case, *McCullum v Board of Education*, 333 U.S. 302 (1948); and the New York released-time case, *Zorach v Clausen*, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). The author, in common with many constitutional scholars, and for similar reasons, sharply criticizes the Court for its sweeping and inflexible interpretation of Jefferson's metaphor about "a wall of separation between Church and State"; for its judicial equivalence of Jefferson's metaphor, written in a polite note to the Danbury Baptists in 1802, with the constitutional text formally ratified by the several states in 1791; for its surprising deviation from its own *Palko* and *Wolf* rule in interpreting the "due process" clause of the XIVth Amendment; and for its judicial transformation of a First Amendment guarantee of power to the states into a denial of that same power against the states.



For, although the "free exercise" clause of the First Amendment has always been a guarantee of personal religious liberty against the federal government only, and the "due process" clause of the XIVth Amendment is now a guarantee of that same personal liberty against the states, yet the "establishment" clause of the First Amendment was never a guarantee of personal liberty at all but simply a principle of federalism. It protected the power of sovereign states to establish, to disestablish, or to continue the establishments of their own state religions and guaranteed them against competition by a national religion.

If the established state religions, which existed when the First Amendment was ratified in 1791, had persisted beyond 1833 and after the XIVth Amendment was ratified in 1868, they would have become unconstitutional, not because of the First Amendment which restricts federal power only, but *because and insofar as* they infringed the *personal liberty* protected by the "due process" clause of the XIVth Amendment which restricts state power. For it is the "liberty" of "any person" which is protected by this clause. But the Court's own standard

of this personal liberty was formulated in the *Palko* case and reemphasized in the *Wolf* case. Wherefore the author, in criticizing Justice Black's opinion in the *Everson* case, correctly observes:

The essential question, however, was . . . whether the subsidy, which in fact was an aid to the parochial schools, was effective in preventing the members of other creeds from freely exercising their religions and whether this deprived them of one of the "principles of liberty and justice, implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." This reliance on the generality of the establishment clause, with the "wall of separation" dogma, was precisely the kind of reasoning to which Justice Holmes was continually objecting, as "doing service for critical analysis" and thus ceasing to "provoke further analysis."

The author believes, as does this reviewer, that the premise of *Everson* is inconsistent with its conclusion; that its conclusion is inconsistent with that of *McCullum*; that the conclusion of *McCullum* is inconsistent with that of *Zorach*; and that the "wall of separation dogma" which permeates them all is historically inaccurate and inconsistent with the Court's own rule in *Palko* and *Wolf*. The book concludes with a salutary precaution against deserting the *Palko-Wolf* principle for constitutional adjudication by catchwords and slogans.

## CAPITALISM'S CONFUSED FRIENDS

PAUL P. HARBRECHT, S.J. •

*Father Harbrecht is a staff member of the Institute of Social Order.*

A lawyer and a philosopher have met to analyze the evils of our economic system and to write a prescription for its ills.<sup>1</sup> Their quest, to discover

an economic system which will promote freedom in a democratic society, is a laudable one; unhappily, it has not been successful.

The authors make such a broad attack on our economic (and political)

<sup>1</sup>THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO. By Louis Kelso and Mortimer Adler. Random House, New York, 265 pp. \$3.75



system that it would be difficult to criticize all their arguments without writing a book much larger than theirs. The basic principles with which they begin and the ultimate ends for which they strive can be accepted by all; their applications of principle are faulty, however, and the means they adopt to promote an economically egalitarian society are poorly chosen.

To be more specific, the authors maintain that one of the basic principles for a just distribution of wealth in any society is that the wealth resulting from any economic operation should be returned proportionately to those who have contributed to the production of that wealth. So far, so good. The authors go on to argue that 90 per cent of the productive wealth of this country can be attributed to capital with only ten per cent due to labor. Increases in productivity are wholly attributable to capital, they say; labor cannot be said to account for any of this increase. Therefore, they conclude, the steadily increasing share of the national wealth which goes to labor (now about 70 per cent) is unjust.

Omitting the fact (which the authors seem to ignore) that a progressively larger portion of the labor force in the last century has gone into the service industries, one might point out that the value of labor is not a fixed constant but is determined by free contract. To this the authors answer that government has added its power to that of the labor unions to preclude the possibility of a competitive determination of the price of labor. If the process of free competition were allowed to operate, say they, labor would

receive no more than 10 per cent of the productive wealth of the U. S.

These propositions take a great deal more proving than the authors have been able to offer in this book.

### **Dubious remedies**

When we proceed to the prescription for our system, we see more clearly what the authors envision as the fruits of their "pure capitalism." It is nothing less than "a society in which ownership of capital by all households is substantially equal and increases at a uniform rate." It is obvious that such a prodigious feat of social engineering would involve a great deal of regimentation. This kind of thing is, of course, repugnant to the authors when stated baldly; yet they do not hesitate to recommend measures which would deprive us of the very economic freedom which is the objective of their entire polemic.

For example, they propose to limit the amount of wealth each household may accumulate to a so-called "viable holding" *i.e.* no greater wealth than is consistent with the opportunity of all other households to acquire a similar capital holding. The ways of acquiring this viable capital holding will be carefully regulated. Presently impecunious starters on this road will be aided by government backed loans. Disproportionate capital holdings will also be prohibited by gift and inheritance taxes which will be, in effect, totally confiscatory when an estate passes a certain size. This could be 1984 by another route.

Another serious defect of the prescription lies in the method of redistributing capital wealth. Distribution

of capital wealth will be accomplished by the purchase of shares in corporations by all households. Presumably everybody will be an owner and each corporation will be owned by millions of people. Corporations, moreover, will have to distribute all their earnings to stockholders. Managements will have to persuade the public to invest new capital for expansion, research, etc. In the light of present experience these measures seem highly impractical, to say the least.

Furthermore, we may ask what kind of "private" property this is where everybody is a co-owner? Is it possible to conduct a business by democratic

methods? And what would happen to the cherished ideals of competition under this system? The authors say, "The essence of property in productive wealth is the right to receive its products" and this is perhaps the key to the basic misconception in this book. The authors are too preoccupied with the *distribution* of wealth—too little concerned with what is really of the essence of property in productive wealth—control.

Still, the book and its errors are perhaps instructive because this honest attempt at a solution to our economic problems illustrates the complexity of the problems we face.

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**THE NEGRO PERSONALITY.** By Bertram P. Karon. Springer, New York, 184 pp. \$4.50

Dr. Bertram P. Karon here supplies a lucid account of his statistical investigation into the effects of discrimination on the psychology of the American Negro. The author insists his study is even more than this, that it is an account of the effects of a caste system as such upon human nature.

The author employed the projective technique of the Tompkins-Horn Picture Arrangement Test (PAT) to assess the personalities of the subjects he investigated. He describes the make-up of the test and the conduct of his experiment, with all the statistical technicalities involved, in a language readily intelligible to the lay reader. Dr. Karon carried out three completely independent testings and applied rigorous norms of statistical significance to validate his conclusions.

In the experiment Southern Negroes, who live under severe caste restrictions, were compared first with Northern whites and then with Northern Negroes, who experience comparatively milder restric-

tions. Finally, Northern whites and Northern Negroes were compared. The experimenter carefully eliminated such factors as chance, intelligence and background as explanations of his results. These results showed striking personality differences in Southern Negroes as compared with either Northern whites or Northern Negroes, while no significant differences between Northern whites and Northern Negroes were detected. This suggests the conclusion that the personality traits which characterize the Southern Negroes, who alone of the three groups live under massive discrimination, are the effect of caste restriction.

When the reader discovers at the end of the book that Negroes in the South feel anger and resentment at mistreatment but consciously suppress this anger under threat of physical violence, he gets the impression that Dr. Karon's statistics are a labored and involved demonstration of the obvious. On the other hand, the discovery that caste restrictions produce a general deadening of a person's whole emotional life may come as a revelation. Again, one may never have suspected be-

fore reading this book that the Southern Negro is as much afraid of losing control of his own anger as he is of the forces that intimidate him.

While one may disagree with the author's contention that human problems are as resolvable by scientific investigation as are the secrets of the physical universe, one must nevertheless agree that convictions in human affairs should be based upon rational, not emotional, grounds. A statistical study of the effects of discrimination on the Negro personality, whatever shortcomings may be inherent in the method itself, has the merit of taking an objective view of an issue that is greatly complicated today by passionate outbursts on both sides of the question.

VINCENT F. SHEPPARD, O.S.B.  
St. Bernard College  
St. Bernard, Alabama

**POLITICAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA: *The Emergence of the Middle Sectors.*** By John J. Johnson. Stanford University Press, Stanford, x, 272 pp. \$2.50

The author of this informative volume is a former Acting Chief of the South American branch of the Division of Research for the American Republics in the State Department; he is now a Professor of History at Stanford University. His former position brought him into contact with a vast amount of material, much of which the present volume transmits to his readers. He shows that Latin American politics are no longer dominated by the landed aristocracy who held sway until World War I or by the military *caudillo* (who both shared this power with the oligarchy and alternated with it in its exercise) but by the newly emerged "middle sectors."

Latin America is, indeed, in the throes of a social change which has left little of the old order, even if the leaders of the new middle classes are as yet far from having developed a stable political framework. Their rule has, in fact, not infrequently been challenged not only by military men but also by groups from the

Left which derive their strength from a combination of industrial workers and intellectuals. Still, Aristotle told us that the middle classes are a stabilizing element because their members do not envy the rich and do understand the poor. They are growing in numbers in Latin America; there are, moreover, certain indications that this fact has begun to prove politically beneficial.

The countries on which Professor Johnson concentrates are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay. These comprise two-thirds of the land area as well as of the population of Latin America. Recent political developments in these nations are related to economic and social changes. The materials presented in support of the conclusions reached are well selected and are always interesting. This reviewer wonders, however, whether social and economic factors should have been discussed in isolation to the extent that Professor Johnson does. There exists an intimate interrelationship between them and the more specifically political factors, including those of political form. Closer attention to these factors would not invalidate any of Professor Johnson's carefully stated conclusions but might have led to a significant shift of emphasis.

Let it be added that this useful and original volume contains a bibliography of 65 pages, which every student of the subject will find helpful.

FERDINAND A. HERMENS  
University of Notre Dame

**SOCIAL WORK IN THE AMERICAN TRADITION.** By Nathan E. Cohen. Holt, New York, 404 pp., \$4.75

Monsignor Cody of Antigonish stated some years ago that it would be difficult for the cooperative movement to flourish in the United States. He intimated politely that our abundance and spirit of competition were not conducive to the development of cooperative efforts, selfishness in interests, or social mindedness.

Social Work is faced with the same problems as cooperatives in the United States. The young profession has found

itself bowing to the winds of different political creeds, to new, intense economic and social problems, varying from periods of heavy immigration to racial discord, world wars and the consequent disruption of the social economy. The profession itself has drifted from a puritan reform concept to the extreme of psychic determinism, from a position of placing causation of social problems in environmental factors to one of stressing cultural differences. In its search for a panacea Social Work has too frequently grasped at fleeting fads such as psychoanalysis. Despite the uncertainty of its acceptance, its approach, or its methods, the profession has grown stronger each decade and can take pride in successes which reflect themselves in the entire American economy.

It took the Great Depression to make it evident that economic development alone is not sufficient for the well-being of the people, that the exploitation of man for economic ends will result in disaster. The necessity of social legislation is no longer disputed by any political party; and Social Work, it should be remembered, was one of the forces that brought about the passage of the Social Security Act, minimum wage laws, and public health measures.

Mr. Cohen takes us through the entire social history of the American people from colonial times to the present and with considerable skill shows how the profession has grown. Along with the social sciences it "wandered between the shadows of philosophy and physiology" for a long time. Nevertheless, "as man moves on ever more rapidly to technological discoveries, he lacks the accompanying know-how to utilize progress for the good of society rather than for its destruction." As early as the administration of President Wilson (1912-1920) it was recognized officially that the Government itself must be concerned with the social welfare of its people.

We have been proud of our industrial achievements, but we have not hitherto stopped thoughtfully enough to count the human cost, the cost of lives snuffed out, of energies overtaxed and broken, the fearful physical and spiritual cost to the men and women and children upon whom

the dead weight and burden of it all has fallen pitilessly the years through . . .

As it comes of age, Mr. Cohen pleads for a stronger sense of responsibility and security on the part of the profession. His good analysis of problems of Social Work in the American tradition will be of considerable help in achieving this desirable end.

A. H. SCHELLER, S.J.  
Saint Louis University

**THE INFLATIONAL SPIRAL: *The Experience in China, 1939-1950.* By Chang Kia-NGau. Wiley, New York, 394 pp. \$10**

Freedom in the modern world demands sound economic formation. That is the lesson conveyed by this study of the inflationary spiral in China in the period between 1939 and 1950.

Professor Chang Kia-NGau of Loyola University of Los Angeles was Governor of the Central Bank of China at this time. He saw the whole tragic process take place before his eyes, saw the economic foundation of freedom fall apart. It was a bitter experience recorded here for the understanding it offers us and as a warning of what may happen to the nations in the Asian world seized by the same inflationary forces. All should read this book and learn wisdom.

Western financial aid and native institutions and resources must combine to bring about a transition from a traditional agrarian economy to a modern urban industrial economy in all Asian countries. We are playing for the highest of all stakes: freedom.

Professor Chang realizes that although economic aid to the underdeveloped nations can never be considered as the sole weapon in the struggle against communism, it can create favorable conditions for political stability and social justice. However, he discourages a too hasty and ambitious plan of economic expansion. Most of the newly independent states in Asia want rapid social progress. They often have gigantic plans for economic development in terms of big dams and big in-

dustrial plants. For these gigantic enterprises foreign aid provides machines and equipment but not everything. The success of foreign aid depends very much upon a sound national finance capable of supplying the necessary local expenditures. Unfortunately, this condition does not often prevail in the underdeveloped countries. The result, in most cases, is "government deficit financing" with an accompanying inflationary spiral. This leads to economic distress, a situation favorable to the spreading of communist influence. For this reason, a sound economic program must be in accord with national income and fiscal resources. A balance between aspiration and cash in the national treasury must be worked out. Overexpansion, a too-hasty attempt to industrialize and an unbalanced economic development which neglects social conditions, would frustrate national economy, bring economic collapse and threaten the basic formation of social life.

From these premises, the author draws his conclusion:

During recent years much has been done by the Free World to aid the economic development of the underdeveloped countries and to bolster their defence. While these efforts are admirable from both a political and humanitarian point of view, the dangers that they pose by threatening inflation should by no means be overlooked. Inflation is no less an enemy of the free society than Communism and, as we have seen in China, may be the harbinger of a Communist triumph. (p. 369)

If we take Professor Chang's words to heart, our foreign aid program will have a better chance of success in helping underdeveloped countries and peoples.

PAUL K. T. SIH, Director,  
Institute of Far Eastern Studies  
Seton Hall University  
Newark, New Jersey

**AS UNIONS MATURE: *An Analysis of the Evolution of American Unionism.*** By Richard A. Lester. Princeton University Press, 171 pp. \$3.75

A recognized authority here sets down his reflections concerning American Unionism and forecasts trends for unions during their maturity based upon these assumptions: 1. economic conditions will continue about the same for the next decade, 2. unions will not represent an increasing percentage of the workers, 3. the labor movement will remain united. In succinct style the author covers such areas as the theories of Hoxie, Perlman and Tannenbaum (finding them inadequate) and internal and external changes affecting unions, such as corrupting influences, diminution of democracy and the implications for economic analysis and public policy.

Chapters on the internal and external relations of unions sharply delineate such trends as the tendency to centralize, the new status and broader outlook of union leaders, the lessening militancy and demagoguery, and the common trends within management and unions as professionalization and use of experts and the reward for the organization man. (These latter aspects raise the interesting query as to where the "gray flannel suit" is being hung.)

With respect to general tendencies and long run trends in unionism, Lester predicates the following: psychological ageing, centralization of control, minimal differences between union and management executives, achievement of more success will reduce the dynamic qualities; reduction of areas of conflict and worker protest, reduction of differences between unions and other community organizations and increased security for unions and their leaders will reduce pressure for militant use of bargaining power.

The book provides a sharp stimulus and should produce subsequent works to verify or deny its hypotheses. Lester summarizes the challenge: "Speculation about the evolutionary process in trade unions is at such an early stage that divergent types of analysis and interpretation should be welcomed."

HARRY B. KIES  
Rockhurst College  
Kansas City, Mo.

SOCIAL ORDER



# Letters

## What Is A Liberal?

While I hope I appreciate the difficulties which must have confronted Professor Victor Ferkiss in preparing "Catholic, Liberal, Democrat," for your November issue, still I would like to register a complaint. Haven't we had enough articles which leave their main theme as such up in the air at their conclusion as at their beginning?

Pleas for communication—purposeful, knowledgeable conversation! How can we talk if we have no terms with which to converse?

Many of us who have been attempting to take seriously the more notable papal encyclicals on the social order have not found it contrary to our Catholic Faith to consider ourselves liberal in Church-temporal affairs matters, even though this often has entailed the very verbosity referred to above. It is well, and even necessary, to take note in preparing articles of this nature that these terms have become confused. On the other hand, aren't we under some obligation to clarify such to the best of our ability? Or must we forego the terms completely?

Doesn't it make some difference, for example, whether or not one capitalizes the words liberal and conservative? In the one large quotation Professor Ferkiss included from Shields' *Democracy and Catholicism in America*, I was not surprised to see the word Liberal capitalized after I found myself disagreeing with the Professor's lower case usage in his context. Most of us are aware that the phenomenon, Liberalism in the 19th century, a *laissez-faire* reaction to centralization, was more akin to modern conservatism. John A. Ryan, when referred to as a liberal—we still hear this—is hardly one of the 19th century variety. Also, what do we mean when again we hear the modern popes called liberal in their approach to the social order?

What does Thomas Gilby, in his interpretation (there are so many!) of *The*

*Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, mean when he says:

Yet if St. Thomas reflected the contractual liberalism of the age, his influence on its later evolution was fainter—and when we speak of liberalism in his regard we mean, not the dominating political force of the nineteenth century but the virtue of social liberality pointing to the *esprit large* and away from the *idée fixe*? (Italics his.) (p. 57)

What did a certain group of young lay Catholic professors mean when they contended in informal statements at a June convention that their students were conservative? (The same group when asked to vote secretly on their usual political party leanings balloted 24-4 in favor of the Democratic party.)

Perhaps my difficulty with Professor Ferkiss' article is what he has not said as much as what he has said. If he intended to write only on 19th century Liberalism, he did not make that clear. Besides, isn't that a bit antiquarian? Even though historians "may take the easy way out," as Professor Ferkiss contends they are "sometimes wont to do when faced with the problem of defining what it is they are talking about," most modern practitioners have pretty well consigned the *laissez-faire* doctrines of 19th century Liberalism to their grave.

Must we 20th century Catholic liberals constantly be mistaken for relativistic 19th century Liberals, while "new-Conservatives" are often permitted to change the meaning of conservative, historically, without being required to give credit to the liberal transfusion they have administered?

These terms, again, are difficult of definition, and perhaps some of us are too ready to see them only in a Catholic context; but the situation is not quite so confusing as Professor Ferkiss' article is wont to make it. Strange that some of us saw what Mr. Cross was about, even while we recognized the shortcomings that



his other - than - Catholic background brought to his effort. A few sentences in this direction would have helped.

Enclosed please find a check for the renewal of my subscription.

REV. JOHN S. SMITH  
Catholic University  
Washington 17, D.C.

### Economic growth imperative

I think you have a good article in Francis J. Corrigan's "Lessons from the Recession," (December, pp. 458-65) and one which is factually correct. However, I am not yet prepared to say that the recession is over while we have such large unemployment. Let us wait until the spring to see if the cumulative forces prevail in such strength as to overcome the unemployment problem.

Personally, I think we should have acted by way of a tax cut and, as you know, I advocated it last February. If we had acted then, some of the problems could have been solved more quickly.

Further, it is not enough merely to return to the 1957 levels for we have since had an increase in the population and the working force and we are still many billions short in our GNP than where we should be.

Finally, the deficit need not necessarily be inflationary, provided it promotes an equal or greater production. That is the key to it.

PAUL H. DOUGLAS  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C.

I have read Professor Francis Corrigan's article "Lessons from the Recession" with much interest and great agreement. It seems to me to be well reasoned throughout and stated with precision for the scholar and simplicity for the layman.

EDWIN G. NOURSE  
Joint Council on Economic Education  
Washington, D. C.

### Light for the Dark Continent

In your November issue you asked: "What happens to SOCIAL ORDER after you've read it? I can answer that it is passed from hand to hand among the students belonging to the St. Augustine Society of the University of Khartoum. From them it passes to their Muslim, Jewish, pagan, and Protestant classmates until the copies are no longer readable. So you see that one copy at least is hardly in any condition to be sent on to a missionary. In fact, I wonder if you could find some generous person who might be willing to send us their old copies, or even buy us an additional subscription or two. I can assure you that they will be put to good use.

Our Society is something like an American Newman Club, sponsoring discussions, lectures, dialogue Masses and Communion gatherings. We look forward to the day when we will have our own building and headquarters and, perhaps most important of all, our own library building. We are nearest to the achievement of this last aim. We have already been promised library space if we only build up a large enough collection of books to make this practical.

Therefore I would like to make a further appeal to your readers. We are most anxious to receive good used books, particularly books in the fields of philosophy, sociology, economics, history, theology and morals, and Catholic literature. We have already begun to collect some books, gifts having been received from friends in the U. S., but we are far from our goal.

If anyone can help us in this project they will be rendering a wonderful service to Catholic education in the Sudan, and will be making available to students of all religions knowledge of Christian culture and ideals.

In conclusion I can only thank you for your magazine, for the articles and the enlightenment which it brings to me and to my charges.

PHILIP O. SINA, F.S.C.J.  
Vice-Principal

Comboni College  
P. O. Box 114  
Khartoum, Sudan.

# Thomas Reprints

***The Place of Sex †***

***Clothes, Culture and  
Modesty\****

***Sex and Society\****

***Religion and the Child\****

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